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ABSTRACT 
 
Commentators have often celebrated care coordination as an encompassing 
solution capable of reducing costs and increasing quality in US healthcare. It is 
unclear, however, under which conditions organizations implement high-quality work 
practices that are essential for achieving improved outcomes in the context of care 
coordination programs. 
My paper examines two institutional factors that improve the quality of work 
practices: occupational community, and regulatory intensity. I argue that the 
interaction of both factors produces higher quality than either would in isolation. I also 
demonstrate how in the absence of both factors, a prioritization of cost-effectiveness 
reduces the quality of work practices. To make my argument I draw on 80 semi-
structured interviews, 80 documents, and 15 hours of observation in my study of three 
care management agencies that focus on serving low-income chronic disease patients 
in one of the most resource-poor communities in New York State. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Care coordination refers to the integration of care practices between two or more care 
providers (Bodenheimer 2008). Improving care coordination has been a long-standing policy aim 
in the US and other countries (Torjesen et al. 2016). For example, the Model Cities Program in 
1966 tried to integrate health and social services across cities and States in the US (Hassett and 
Austin 1997). In the 1990s, supply-side economists pointed to more integrated delivery systems 
such as Kaiser Permanente as cost-reducing and quality-enhancing exemplars (Enthoven 2010: 
65). The advent of accountable care organizations and similar programs in the 2010 Affordable 
Care Act demonstrated that improving care coordination continues to be the dominant way 
policymakers attempt to improve US healthcare (Marmor and Oberlander 2012).  
However, care coordination programs, i.e. programs aimed at improving care 
coordination, have shown mixed results. Despite evidence demonstrating that care coordination 
programs can be successful, it remains unclear under which conditions these programs in fact 
realize their potential (Jackson et al. 2013). For example, programs in the 1960s and 1970s failed 
to generate savings, most likely due to their grand scope and resistance at the service delivery 
level (Hassett and Austin 1997). A recent meta-analysis of care coordination programs found 
only small significant increases in patient satisfaction but no other positive outcomes (Stokes et 
al. 2015).  
Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is: under which conditions do 
organizations successfully implement care coordination programs, where success means 
increasing the quality of work practices? I understand the quality of work practices as a 
combination of the level of skill that workers apply in their work with how intensive their work 
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is, where ‘intensity’ refers to the frequency and quality of workers’ interactions with program 
members, physicians and co-workers, and to the quality of information workers generate. I 
examine the impact of two institutional conditions on the quality of work practices: social 
conditions as exemplified by occupational community and political conditions as exemplified by 
regulatory intensity. By bringing together a sociological institutionalist approach that focuses on 
social conditions and a historical institutionalist approach that focuses on political conditions 
(Hall and Taylor 1996) I demonstrate how it is their interaction that generates high-quality work 
practices.  
Previous studies of care coordination have focused on establishing that care coordination 
and similar practices improve health outcomes. Based on these studies we know that care 
coordination practices can have desirable effects. These studies, however, connect these 
desirable work practices neither with their underlying social dynamics nor with broader political 
factors. They thus do not answer the question of the conditions under which organizational or 
public policymakers successfully increase care coordination. By contrast, this thesis focuses on 
the implementation of care coordination programs and provides an answer to the question of 
which factors shape variation in the quality of work practices in the context of such programs. 
Previous studies of care coordination exist in the fields of health policy and employment 
relations. The health policy literature focuses on evaluating public policy programs on a large 
scale (usually across an entire State) by associating these programs with health and cost 
outcomes. This approach demonstrates that State-wide, public policy programs can be an 
important factor in shaping work practices by showing that such programs can reduce costs or 
improve health outcomes on a large scale. However, health policy studies do not focus on 
variation in work organization in terms of skills or work design because the policy programs they 
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have evaluated have usually had set of guidelines for all organizations that participate in the 
program. Moreover, the health policy studies that have associated particular practices with 
positive outcomes have shown that frequent, face-to-face contacts between care coordinators and 
members are desirable but they have also not examined under which conditions such desirable 
practices emerge.  
While the health policy literature has identified policy programs as a potentially 
important conditioning factor, the employment relations literature has outlined a set of desirable 
work practices but without systematically investigating their underlying social and regulatory 
dynamics. Employment relations studies have shown that high-performance work practices that 
function as a system of practices also improve organizational performance in the healthcare 
sector. At the same time, they have not examined the factors that condition the success of such 
practices because their approach has not extended beyond formal management practices, neither 
in terms of social dynamics that underlie the workplace nor in terms of factors that extend 
beyond the workplace such as different public policy designs. Employment relations scholars 
who have researched care coordination and similar practices have understood the broader context 
as a set of empirical trends (for example escalating costs in the healthcare sector) that motivate 
the search for cost-saving or quality-enhancing practices but not as factors that condition the 
practices they recommend.       
To build on these literatures and answer the question of when the practices they have 
identified as desirable become effective, I focus on the institutional conditions that lead to higher 
quality work practices in the implementation of care coordination programs. I argue that, 
depending on different institutional conditions, organizations implement care coordination 
programs with different levels of quality. Moreover, I identify the interaction between two 
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institutional conditions as a combination that leads to a higher quality of work practices than just 
one of them alone. My thesis thus makes three contributions: it examines the implementation of 
programs designed to increase the quality of work practices, identifies two institutional 
conditions that lead to variation in the quality of work practices, and conceptualizes the 
relationship between the two conditions. My approach contributes a richer understanding of 
variation in care coordination practices because the conditions I identify underlie and constitute 
the effectiveness of practices that employment relations scholars have identified as desirable. 
Furthermore, I connect workplace dynamics to broader regulatory conditions and advance recent 
literature on public contracting by demonstrating how and why public policymakers’ 
occupationally-based (as opposed to cost-based) priorities in designing a program lead to a 
higher quality of work practices. 
I make these contributions based on my matched case comparisons of how three care 
management agencies implemented outpatient care coordination programs at the same health 
system in New York State. By drawing on literature that investigates the importance of 
occupational and regulatory dynamics, I show how the interaction between occupational 
community and a high level of regulatory intensity leads to high-quality work practices.    
I found that under the conditions of a lacking community that supports occupational 
norms, and low regulatory standards, enforcement and incentives, cost-effectiveness was the 
primary concern in one care coordination program. I dub this program ‘LowQual’ because its 
focus on cost-effectiveness led to the lowest quality of work practices among all care 
coordination programs. By contrast, I found a higher quality of work practices in a care 
coordination program that operated under the same low regulatory intensity as LowQual but 
exhibited a community that supported occupational standards, norms and identifications derived 
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from behavioral health. I dub this agency ‘MedQual’ because in following these occupational 
standards, norms and identifications, practitioners at MedQual generated high skill levels but 
only an intermediate level of intensity. The highest quality of work practices I found at 
‘HighQual’ which did not only have a community that was supportive of occupational standards, 
norms and identifications like MedQual but also operated under a policy program that mandated, 
effectively enforced, and provided incentives for a higher intensity of work design. Furthermore, 
I found that the public policymakers who designed the program that generated higher quality at 
HighQual followed standards that a broader HIV/AIDS community spanning three decades had 
developed. By contrast, the main concern of public policymakers who designed the low 
regulatory intensity at both LowQual and MedQual was on cost-effectiveness. 
Based on these findings I conclude that a community that supports occupational 
standards, norms and identifications at the workplace level generates a higher quality of work 
practices. Moreover, I conclude that under the condition of a public policy program with higher 
standards, higher levels of enforcement, and incentives for following these high standards a 
workplace-level occupational community generates the highest quality of work practices. In the 
absence of a workplace-level occupational community or where regulators do not amplify the 
standards of an occupational community at a broader level through high regulatory intensity, 
cost-effectiveness concerns lower the quality of work practices as far as regulations permit.  
My finding of the impact of occupational community is relevant to organizational 
policymakers who want to know how to design jobs, recruit for, and implement a higher quality 
of work practices. Moreover, my finding of the impact of regulatory intensity is relevant for 
public policymakers who want to know how to design standards, enforcement mechanisms and 
reimbursement systems that generate a higher quality of work practices.  
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In the following sections, I review health policy and employment relations studies of care 
coordination to show why the question of broader structuring conditions is important and 
generally unanswered. I then review the concepts that guided my fieldwork and that I 
subsequently extended by showing how they relate to the quality of work practices and to each 
other. After describing my methodology, I then discuss my findings in light of these concepts. I 
conclude by reflecting on my research’s internal and external validity, and on how I 
conceptualize the relationship between occupational community and regulatory intensity.  
  
2. Perspectives on Care Coordination and the Quality of Work Practices 
This section discusses previous approaches to understanding care coordination and 
introduces the concepts that form the basis for the richer understanding I wish to generate. The 
approaches that health policy and employment relations scholars have taken in studying care 
coordination have focused on identifying practices and policies that they associate with health 
and/or cost outcomes. These perspectives have established certain work practices as desirable 
and provided useful dimensions for understanding variation in work practices. They, however, 
have not examined the institutional conditions that enable the effective implementation of these 
practices, and the outcomes they studied only partially captured how work practices varied in my 
fieldwork. By contrast, I draw on the concepts of ‘occupational community’ and ‘regulatory 
intensity’ from sociological and other literatures, through which I develop a perspective that 
captures the broader conditions that structure variation in work practices, thus connecting 
particular workplace dynamics to broader, contextual dynamics.  
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The concepts of occupational community and regulatory intensity connect workplaces to 
broader contextual factors by identifying the sources of workplace dynamics not only in formal 
management practices but in social processes that lie outside of the immediate workplace and 
underlie its formal management practices. An occupational community at the workplace level 
means that workers practice and share norms that derive from the accumulated experience of 
workers in an occupation, either through previous positions at the same workplace or at other 
workplaces, or through skills transfers via on-the-job training. Occupationally-based practices 
thus transcend any particular workplace. Regulations entail public policymakers setting, 
enforcing, and providing incentives for workplace standards independently of any particular 
workplace. In the case of high regulatory intensity, policymakers design regulations in such a 
way that work practices are likely to conform to the standards set through regulations.      
    
2.1 Establishing the Importance of High-Quality Care Coordination 
The first set of relevant studies of care coordination come from the field of health policy. 
These studies show that public, often State-wide care coordination programs can lead to 
improved health or cost outcomes, indicating that the design of public programs is an important 
factor in shaping successful care coordination. Because they have, however, paid little attention 
to the underlying institutional and organizational conditions that shape the  effectiveness of 
coordination programs they do not explain variation in care coordination practices within a given 
region or at a workplace level. For example, Brennan-Ing and colleagues provided evidence that 
the New York State (NYS) COBRA program, a care coordination program established in the 
mid-1980s to support families living with HIV/AIDS, helped program members receive 
medication for non-HIV/AIDS, chronic conditions and increase immunity compared to a control 
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group that did not receive care coordination services (Brennan-Ing et al. 2016: 7f.). Brennan-Ing 
and colleagues mentioned the program’s goals and its use of multi-disciplinary teams but did not 
further investigate the program’s work organization.  
Other studies have also demonstrated the possibility of improving health or cost 
outcomes through public care coordination programs. A Medicaid transitional care program in 
North Carolina reduced the admission rates of high-risk Medicaid patients by 20 percent 
(Jackson et al. 2013). Furthermore, a care coordination program for Medicaid patients in 
Washington State significantly reduced costs for inpatient admissions by $318 per member per 
month (Xing et al. 2015). And four of eleven Medicare care coordination pilot programs reduced 
hospitalizations by 10.7 percent per 100 beneficiaries on average (Brown et al. 2012).  
These health policy studies indicate some common practices among successful programs 
but they do not systematically investigate variation in work organization, for example variation 
in care coordinators’ skill levels or in work design. This is because the programs health policy 
scholars have studied usually set State-wide guidelines for work organization; and health policy 
scholars’ focus has been on evaluating programs at a large-scale, regional level. Successful 
programs have typically consisted of highly-skilled care coordinators (usually registered nurses) 
who coordinate health and social services for program members as needed, provide members 
with health education (including managing their medications), coordinate relevant information to 
all care providers, and interact with program members face-to-face at least once per month in 
addition to regular phone calls (Brown et al. 2012; DuBard et al. 2012; Jackson et al. 2013; Xing 
et al. 2015).    
Despite these commonly identified successful practices, health policy scholars have not 
investigated why organizations have or have not adopted these practices, instead calling for more 
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research on the conditions that lead to effective changes in work practices (Jackson et al. 2013). 
Moreover, other than demonstrating that particular practices can be successful they have not 
systematically categorized the differences between successful and unsuccessful practices. 
DuBard and colleagues attributed different ‘resource intensities’ to how care coordinators can 
interact with program members (DuBard et al. 2012). Specifying this categorization further, 
Jackson and colleagues categorized telephonic or written communication as ‘low intensity’ 
interactions, face-to-face interactions during visits to the provider, patient education, and 
coordination of appointments as ‘moderate intensity’ interactions, and home visits by a care 
coordinator or a face-to-face appointment with a clinical pharmacist as ‘high intensity’ 
interactions (Jackson et al. 2013). While higher intensity practices occur in programs that 
improve health or cost outcomes, health policy scholars have not conceptualized why these 
differences in interactions are of importance.        
Like health policy studies, the employment relations literature on care coordination has 
also found that care coordination and similar practices can lead to better care and reduced costs, 
however, without examining the institutional conditions that structure the success of these 
practices. These studies built on previous work that established the concept of ‘high-performance 
work practices’ and how they lead to better organizational performance in manufacturing, retail 
and telecommunications. Moreover, these studies only rarely examined broader contextual 
factors such as industry trends as conditions that shape workplace dynamics, instead 
conceptualizing them as motivators for the search for practices that improve performance. The 
main focus has been on how different levels of skills, worker discretion, and compensation fit 
together to constitute a given production model as a consistent ‘bundle’ or ‘system’ of practices 
(MacDuffie 1995; Appelbaum et al. 2000). 
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While the health policy literature has identified desirable care coordination practices the 
employment relations literature has provided rationales for how and why different dimensions of 
these practices fit together. For example, while a mass production model combines low skill 
levels with minimum discretion to minimize labor and other costs, a professional service model 
combines high skill levels with a high level of discretion to maximize quality (Batt and 
Moynihan 2002). More frequent communication with team members and technical experts in an 
organization also constituted a higher quality of work practices in this literature (Appelbaum et 
al. 2000: 119). In the context of inpatient, acute care nursing, Gil Preuss argued that not only the 
frequency of interactions but also the quality of information that interactions with patients 
produce is important for the outcomes of work practices (Preuss 2003). This is because higher 
skilled workers can apply their skills to incorporate not only the goals of the immediate task but 
also to gather contextual information that may reflect a more accurate version of a patient’s 
health status (Preuss 2003: 593). Therefore, higher quality information not only derives from 
more frequent interactions but also from higher skilled workers’ more accurate interpretations.  
Jody Hoffer Gittell has identified similar relationships between high-performance work 
practices and increased levels of ‘relational coordination’ – a composite of frequent, accurate and 
timely information with mutual respect, and shared goals and knowledge – that she associated 
with shorter hospital stays and higher patient satisfaction in inpatient settings (Hoffer Gittell 
2009). She identified 12 particular practices, for example recruiting workers with good teamwork 
skills or designing jobs around patient needs, that she categorized as high-performance work 
practices. In later work, Hoffer Gittell developed the concepts of ‘relational leadership’ (i.e. the 
situation in which supervisors who foster relational coordination) and ‘relational co-production’ 
(i.e. the situation in which workers extend relational coordination to include customers) (Hoffer 
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Gittell 2016). While Hoffer Gittell’s studies demonstrated desirable work practices, including 
formal human resource management practices that promoted them, she did not investigate the 
institutional factors that underlie and enable the adoption and variation of these practices. For 
example, Hoffer Gittell does not investigate which knowledge or skills supervisors draw on to 
successfully foster shared goals and mutual respect and how these dynamics vary according to 
workers’ different skill levels.  
Other studies that emphasize concepts similar to care coordination practices such as 
collaboration, reliability-enhancing work practices and patient-centered care have also associated 
these practices with positive health outcomes. In their study of collaborative teamworking in 
neonatal intensive care, Nembhard and Tucker showed an association between the more frequent 
interactions of workers with different disciplinary backgrounds and lower patient mortality in 23 
neonatal intensive care units (Nembhard and Tucker 2011). They identified deliberate learning 
activities and continuous improvement practices as factors that improved collaboration 
(Nembhard and Tucker 2011: 911) but they did not elaborate on the conditions for successfully 
implementing these factors nor on why there were no conflicts between workers from 
disciplinary backgrounds that may inhibit collaboration. 
Vogus and Iacobucci use a related, but different conceptual framework, which they call 
‘reliability-enhancing work practices’ (Vogus and Iacobucci 2016). They used a social-
psychological scale that included hiring criteria that emphasized interpersonal skills and a culture 
of ‘respectful interaction’. These were associated with fewer medical errors and patient falls 
(Vogus and Iacobucci 2016: 928). Building trust and permitting employee discretion are 
important reliability-enhancing practices but the determinants of trust and discretion in 
healthcare remained unclear in this study.  
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Patient-centered care is yet another concept that researchers and practitioners have used 
to define a set of work practices that promote interactions between care workers and their 
patients by incorporating patient preferences into their work practices and focusing more on 
patient education (Avgar et al. 2011). Avgar and colleagues associated patient-center care 
practices with reduced medical errors and increased patient satisfaction (Avgar et al. 2011: 432). 
Moreover, Burns and colleagues demonstrated that nursing homes with a focus on patient-
centered care sustained the quality of care as measured by public regulators’ evaluations because 
managers’ and workers’ prioritization of patient interests led them to seek out workarounds, for 
example foregoing breaks or extending job responsibilities, that shielded residents from the 
negative effects of deteriorating working conditions (Burns et al. 2016). However, both studies 
did not investigate the underlying dynamics that prompted managers and workers to choose 
patient-centered care.  
Building on these approaches, I examine the institutional conditions that enable the 
successful implementation of high-quality, care coordination practices. I attempt to go beyond 
these approaches by demonstrating that the interaction of social and political conditions produces 
the highest quality of work practices. While the social condition of an occupational community 
centered around behavioral health increases the quality of work practices, it is only under the 
political condition of high regulatory intensity, i.e. regulations that promote and financially 
sustain high, occupationally-based standards, that an occupational community produces the 
highest quality of work practices. Without an occupational community and with low regulatory 
intensity, the prioritization of cost-effectiveness means that the quality of work practices is 
lowered as far as regulations permit. Moreover, my concept of the quality of work practices 
extends the health policy concept of ‘intensity’ by incorporating its relationship to skill levels but 
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it is also more focused than the high-performance work literature because it examines a smaller 
amount of work practice dimensions that exclude variation on worker discretion and 
compensation. While central elements of the health policy and employment relations literatures 
informed my research I develop a new understanding of the quality of work practices that is 
more precise.  
 
2.2 Occupational Community as a Factor that Structures the Quality of Work Practices 
While the health policy and employment relations literatures have established that better 
care coordination is associated with better patient care, they do not provide a deeper institutional 
explanation of creating the social dynamics necessary for better care coordination.  The 
sociological literature on occupations and occupational community, by contrast, provides a 
framework for understanding how the knowledge, skills, values, and routines shared by members 
of the same occupation create the conditions for better work practices and care coordination. 
This literature has also often conceptualized this way of structuring work as an alternative to 
structuring work according to cost concerns derived from transactional exchanges in markets or 
abstract rules in bureaucracies (Adler et al. 2008). This perspective demonstrates that social 
processes beyond the immediate workplace can structure systems of work practices.  
Like occupations in general, occupational community consists of individuals engaging in 
a similar set of tasks with similar skill requirements (Damarin 2006), where skill refers to a 
composite of knowledge and the “capacity to use knowledge in accomplishing a task” (Freidson 
2001: 33). In addition to having similar tasks and skill requirements, an occupational community 
only exists if individuals identify strongly and positively with the work they do rather than 
viewing their work instrumentally as a means to gain income (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 
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299). Moreover, an occupational community exists when these occupational members share and 
implement common standards and values relating to their work that do not derive from non-
occupational sources (such as the work rules of a manager who does not have occupational 
education or experience). Individuals acquire these common work standards and values through 
informal on-the-job training by members of the occupation or through their own learning on the 
job over many years (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 294). Having received membership through 
on-the-job training or work experience, occupational members can trust each other to act based 
on their common work standards, values, and commitment to the occupation (Lee et al. 2000), 
which means they are more likely to cooperate with each other to achieve their goals. 
While occupational community constitutes a form of worker control it can also extend to 
hierarchically higher levels, for example as front-line supervisors or work unit directors, if 
occupational members take on such supervisory positions (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 332). 
In supervisory positions, occupational members can choose to draw on the occupational training 
and experience they have acquired when they design and execute supervisory functions, and 
thereby support the reproduction of the occupational identifications, knowledge and norms that 
constitute an occupational community. For example, they can design job requirements according 
to occupational standards and thus, only select occupational members into their organizations. In 
this case, the character of common managerial functions such as job design, recruitment, work 
design, and the management of potential workplace conflicts take on an occupational character 
because the occupational member in this supervisory position decided to draw on her/his 
occupational knowledge and identifications to fulfil these functions. The underlying driver of 
these functions thus does not lie in administrative rules or market specifications but in a social 
process that undergirds and transcends the immediate workplace, namely in the occupational 
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knowledge and experience accumulated in other workplaces or other time periods in the same 
workplace (often mediated by on-the-job training).   
Besides supervisory structures, another important workplace process that can sustain an 
occupational community is ‘workplace assimilation’. Workplace assimilation refers to the 
situation in which non-professionals or other professions can “learn on the job a craft version of 
given professions’ knowledge systems” (Abbott 1988: 65) and thus approximate or mimic some 
of the transferring profession’s values and work practices.  
This phenomenon is particularly relevant for the profession of social work in the US 
because social work has had a long history of workplace assimilation by non-professionals that 
started after non-professional social workers met a surge in demand after the Second World War 
(Austin 1978). Because social workers and other behavioral specialists like psychotherapists and 
psychiatrists constitute the most proximate sources of occupational standards for care 
coordination, non-professional care coordinators may assimilate their work practices if these 
behavioral health specialists view themselves as part of or are willing to be supportive of an 
occupational community with non-professional care coordinators. In this case, social workers 
may promote the importance of understanding individuals in relation to their social environment, 
individuals’ empowerment to attain a better life (Austin 1978: 31) and a commitment to advocate 
for broader economic and social change (Schneider and Netting 1999), which are typically 
values that social work professionals have held since the profession’s inception (Franklin 1986). 
By contrast, professionals may inhibit workplace assimilation if they refuse to recognize 
themselves as part of the same occupational community with non-professional care coordinators. 
While professionalism shares the same criteria as occupational community it has additional 
criteria that increase its level of occupational control and enhance its status. Professions 
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generally draw on a codified body of knowledge, which means they must complete university 
education to certify their membership. Moreover, the state or professional associations sanction 
professionals’ claims to perform tasks to the exclusion of other occupations through licensing or 
scope of practice laws (Krause 1971; Abbott 1988). If professionals refuse to cooperate with 
non-professionals this may constitute a defense of their exclusive rights and privileges that the 
profession as a whole has claimed on a society-wide basis rather than simple ‘unwillingness’ to 
cooperate.  
Because physicians have successfully claimed the highest entry barriers, compensation, 
and status in the health field since the early 20th century (Freidson 2001) they can most easily 
refuse cooperation with non-professionals. In a study of the relations between radiologists and 
technologists, for example, Stephen Barley showed how radiologists in one hospital used their 
experience and professional authority to deride technologists’ competence (Barley 1986). By 
contrast, the radiologists’ lack of experience in working with a CT scanner in another hospital 
meant they were receptive to the technologists’ competence and engaged in collaborative 
teamwork with them. Katherine Kellogg provided another example in which physicians in one 
health center were receptive to community health workers who brokered between physicians and 
lawyers to comply with new regulations for legal screening, given that physicians regarded these 
tasks as low-status while community health workers regarded them as status-increasing (Kellogg 
2014: 925, 935).   
An example of an occupational community that will be important for understanding care 
coordination in New York State is the HIV/AIDS community. Particularly in HIV/AIDS 
prevention, volunteers and untrained social workers proliferated to coordinate the needs of 
people living with HIV/AIDS. Gay Men’s Health Crisis, one of the first community-based 
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organizations set up in 1982 in New York City, developed the buddy system, in which volunteers 
helped HIV positive people by navigating medical and social services appointments, and by 
acting as lay counsellors and advocates (Altman 1994: 38). Moreover, behavioral interventions 
such as peer education and care coordination expanded because of the lack of a medical solution 
to dealing with HIV/AIDS (Altman 1994: 125) until 1996. In this way, a community of 
practitioners that included volunteers and non-professional workers in addition to professionals 
developed and proliferated care coordination methods that can constitute a basis for current care 
coordinators’ occupational communities.  
Overall, an occupational community structures work practices according to occupational 
knowledge and experience. It refers to the operation of a community of practitioners in which 
supervisory structures, relations between different occupational groups, and worker 
identifications promote occupational standards to cooperate through and engage in higher quality 
work practices.  
 
2.3 Regulatory Intensity as a Factor that Structures the Quality of Work Practices 
The aim of this section is to develop a concept that captures how variation in the design 
of regulations as a political factor can structure work practices in addition to the social factor of 
occupational community. I build on research on the impact of regulations on organizations, on 
the impact of public procurement on working conditions, on the efficacy of private regulation, 
and on my fieldwork to develop the concept of ‘regulatory intensity’. In contrast to the health 
policy literature on care coordination, this concept does not only take stock of the fact that there 
are policy programs that attempt to structure work practices but it also attempts to estimate when 
organizational policymakers are likely to translate these policy programs into effective work 
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practices. It thus highlights the importance of program design and tries to capture the variation in 
care coordination practices that different public care coordination programs produce. 
I define regulatory intensity as the level of constraint that rules by actors external to an 
organization put on that organization with regard to the organization’s ability to determine work 
practices. High regulatory intensity means that organizations have little ability not to follow 
regulatory standards because regulatory standards, enforcement, and incentives effectively 
promote compliance. Conversely, low regulatory intensity means organizations can set their own 
standards of work practices with little or no outside constraint because rule-setting explicitly 
permits this, the actor setting the rules is not able to enforce them effectively, or financial 
incentives undermine compliance. To add more specificity to this definition of regulatory 
intensity, I will now review previous studies that demonstrate the importance of regulations for 
the nature of work organization. 
Organizational research has shown a general relationship between different aspects of 
regulations and work practices. These factors include public regulation, the unambiguity of 
standards, federal contracting, and professional influence. However, this research has not 
pinpointed the mechanisms and causal linkages underlying these relationships. Inspired 
particularly by the concepts of coercive and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983), this research shows that the state is an important, rule-setting actor in an organization’s 
environment (Oliver 1990). For example, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) showed that State-level 
mandates for civil service reform led to quick and sudden rates of adoption in comparison to 
States that did not mandate such reform. If, however, rules are ambiguous, professionals working 
in organizations interpret these rules differently which creates variation in how organizations 
adapt their practices to public regulations. Lauren Edelman found that equal employment 
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opportunity and affirmative action regulations were ambiguous (for example regarding what 
constitutes discrimination) and had weak enforcement mechanisms (of only requiring workforce 
reporting and a focus on procedures, not outcomes) (Edelman 1992: 1536). In response, 
organizations with personnel departments and with federal contracts were more likely to 
establish more extensive mechanisms (Edelman 1992: 1565). John Sutton and Frank Dobbin also 
looked at the effects of legal uncertainty (Sutton and Dobbin 1996). They found that increasing 
the state’s ability to enforce regulations through stronger enforcement mechanisms such as 
higher monitoring requirements in the 1970s, more attention by Californian courts in the 1980s, 
and being a federal contractor made organizations more likely to institute grievance procedures 
(Sutton and Dobbin 1996: 805f.).    
Another strand of recent research has focused on the relationship between public 
procurement of services, and employment relations. Because this research area is relatively new 
the findings have so far been confined to establishing the importance of public procurement for 
employment relations and less in identifying stable patterns leading to effective increases in 
labor standards. However, this research illuminates insights from organizational research relating 
to the importance of public contracts which is important in US healthcare because the 
government accounted for 48.3 percent of total health spending in 2014 (WHO 2014).  
Karen Jaehrling discussed how public authorities can make contract awards conditional 
upon meeting labor and other standards such as mandated pay scales or quality criteria in 
addition to price criteria (Jaehrling 2015). Moreover, her empirical examples highlighted how a 
focus purely on lowering prices through public procurement led to employers understaffing or 
using non-standard employment contracts while meeting pay scale requirements (Jaehrling 2015: 
159). Katherine Ravenswood and Sarah Kaine (2015) also have demonstrated the importance of 
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public procurement in long-term care in Australia and New Zealand. They showed how political 
contingencies such as a change of government prevented these states from promoting higher 
standards through contract awards (Ravenswood and Kaine 2015: 553). Similarly, Jantz and 
colleagues discussed how different political priorities such as diverting accountability for failed 
procurement attempts from national to local government in Denmark shaped the use of multiple, 
co-existing sources of accountability, including accountability through market incentives (Jantz 
et al. 2015: 8). 
Research on private regulation in the context of global value chains has also 
demonstrated the importance of different types of enforcement mechanisms and financial 
incentives for structuring work practices, though in very different industry and country contexts 
compared to care coordination in the US. In a case study of one apparel value chain, Locke and 
colleagues described different types of mechanisms for enforcing private labor standards. While 
they found that the buyer firm was generally ineffective at raising standards because it did not 
sanction poor standards by withdrawing its business from non-compliant supplier, Locke and 
colleagues discussed examples of auditors building up long-term relationships with supplier firm 
managers and thereby using their workplace visits to help these managers implement better work 
practices (Locke at al. 2009). An earlier study (Locke et al. 2007: 16) also confirmed the 
importance of auditing through more frequent workplace visits by personnel capable of 
promoting effective work practices.  
In contrast to this focus on audits, Maja Tampe emphasized the importance of a pricing 
mechanism that permitted higher quality labor standards in addition to standard-setting in the 
context of cocoa production (Tampe 2016). She found that a successful cocoa producing 
organization could use ties to various buyer firms to improve production processes, and thus 
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justify higher price premiums on their products than an unsuccessful producer. This enabled the 
successful organization to transfer the price differential on to farmers (Tampe 2016: 24). 
Tampe’s study demonstrated how payment mechanisms can provide the financial viability 
required for higher quality work practices. 
Building on these three research streams, I will now conceptualize a high level of 
regulatory intensity more concretely. Drawing on the organizational and public contracting 
literatures, setting unambiguous, specific standards related to work organization highly 
constrains organizations. Moreover, drawing on the literature on private regulation in value 
chains, enforcement through high monitoring requirements and more frequent, workplace-based 
visits also constitutes more constraints. Last, also discussed in the global value chains literature, 
a payment mechanism that either strongly sanctions non-compliance or actively rewards 
compliance with higher standards increases the risk of losing financial rewards, and thus, 
promotes the implementation of higher standards. The converse of lacking or ambiguous labor-
related standards, low monitoring and infrequent, remote audits within a decentralized regulatory 
structure, and payment that does not provide incentives for complying with higher standards 
constitutes low regulatory intensity.  
Through my case comparisons, I will demonstrate how both occupational community and 
high regulatory intensity improve the quality of work practices. Before discussing these findings, 
however, I will discuss my methodology. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
I chose qualitative methods because my goal was to generate an empirically grounded, 
theoretical understanding of the institutional conditions that contribute to variation in the 
implementation of care coordination programs. Case study research is suitable for these kinds of 
questions (Yin 2003). 
My research design consisted of comparing three care coordination programs – my units 
of analysis – that were located at three care management agencies. These agencies, in turn, were 
part of the same health system located in a large, urban area in NYS. Choosing care management 
agencies from the same health system excluded important potential causes of variation. The 
agencies experienced the same industry pressures (and the same industry sub-segment of clinic-
based outpatient care), the same top and senior-level management strategy, the same financial 
pressures, the same electronic medical record, and the generally above average acuity of the 
health system’s catchment area. The same trade union also organized all health workers 
(throughout the history of the care coordination programs under study). This meant that the same 
collective bargaining agreement applied to all CCs (without any differences in access to union 
resources such as training funds or workplace representation; see Section 4.4). 
The area of my study sites had above average rates of Medicaid utilization, 
unemployment, mortality, suicide and homicide rates compared to the rest of NYS. Additionally, 
the health system had been in a resource-poor financial status since at least four years before the 
inception of all care coordination programs in the care management agencies. I chose this 
resource-poor research setting because it is appropriate to the populations that care coordination 
programs usually target, namely low-income, chronic disease patients (Jackson et al. 2013). 
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Moreover, this research setting was also apt because we would expect resource constraints to 
make it more difficult to achieve higher quality work practices. However, because the factors I 
identified occurred in a resource-poor setting, we would expect these factors to translate more 
easily into a resource-rich setting. Therefore, these factors are likely to be of interest also for 
resource-rich settings.  
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
I base my case comparisons on fieldwork I conducted between October 2015 and 
December 2016 which included 16 site visits. I conducted 80 semi-structured interviews and did 
15 hours of non-participant observation (of team meetings, training sessions, and committee 
meetings of a public policy program situated at the health system). I collected 80 documents that 
among others included collective bargaining agreements, training materials, reports of State-level 
policy programs, and relevant organizations’ annual reports.  
Because I chose a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) my data 
generation and analysis proceeded iteratively. During my first few site visits I tried to ascertain 
all areas at the health system that had some form of care coordination (including outpatient 
clinics dealing with substance abuse). I then chose the three care management agencies because 
they had the largest care coordination teams and were comparable in terms of the tasks they 
fulfilled as well as their general structure (being embedded in outpatient clinics). Moreover, the 
public policy programs that regulated each agency’s care coordination program consisted of 
voluntary participation and had similar eligibility criteria and thus, admitted patient populations 
with similar acuity: the New York State Department of Health Health Home Program (NYS-
DoH HHP) admitted Medicaid eligible individuals who were HIV positive, or had a severe 
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mental illness, or two common chronic conditions (for example diabetes and asthma). The New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Care Coordination Program (NYC-
DoHMH CCP) admitted HIV positive individuals but the provider manual also articulated a 
strong overlap with the NYS-DoH HHP, mentioning it 19 times, particularly in sections that 
concerned intake procedures that prohibited member enrollment in both Programs.  
After choosing the three care management agencies, I tried to ascertain how the quality of 
work practices varied in the care coordination programs and then, what the potential factors 
shaping these differences were (based on reviews of some of the relevant literature discussed 
above; see also Section 4.4).  
I defined the quality of work practices as including two dimensions: the level of skill 
required for the job and the intensity of the work design. Similar to Preuss’s (2003) study, I 
defined higher levels of education and experience as constitutive of higher quality because it 
generated higher-quality information in combination with higher-intensity work design. Because 
my interest was in understanding occupational dynamics, I measured experience as experience in 
occupations that entailed the same or similar tasks as a worker’s current care coordination 
position, rather than as seniority at a particular workplace.  
The second characteristic of ‘intensity’ refers to the number and quality of interactions 
CCs had with other providers and with program members, and the number of staff members with 
whom members regularly interacted. Accordingly, I interpret a higher number of interactions 
among service providers, and between service providers and members as more time dedicated to 
a member’s care (as indicated by caseloads, case conferences and the division of labor among 
workers and supervisors). Moreover, similar to the health policy literature’s emphasis on face-to-
face interactions and to Preuss’s emphasis on the quality of information, I measured the quality 
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of interactions between CCs and other service providers, and CCs and members. I categorized 
acting as a translator in visits with medical providers as lower quality than engaging with 
medical providers through advocacy or in a case conference on behalf of members. Moreover, I 
categorized a reliance only on self-reported information through telephonic and written 
interactions as lower quality than additionally cross-checking this information with contextual 
information from agency or home visits.  
Overall, higher levels of skill and intensity constituted higher quality work practices. This 
operationalization is also consistent with care coordination understood as the deliberate 
integration of the care practices of all providers involved in a patient’s care (Bodenheimer 2008). 
This is because effectively integrating care practices does not simply mean more coordination of 
information but more coordination of more useful information, which in turn depends on 
workers’ skill levels.  
To ascertain how and why the quality of work practices varied across care coordination 
programs, I asked the Directors, Supervisors, CCs, and the doctors working with them about the 
background of the clinics, their care coordination programs, and the public care coordination 
policy programs; training and recruiting practices; their own educational and career backgrounds, 
what they value, and what motivates them about their work. I also asked them to  describe a 
typical working day, including characterizations of the people with whom they interact; and how 
they viewed their working conditions and whether the trade union had a role in their daily work. 
In addition, I interviewed upper middle managers and senior managers at the health system to 
learn about its financial status, labor relations, general management strategy, and relationships 
with other organizations in the region. I also interviewed representatives from various trade 
unions responsible for the health system under study, other health systems close by or for the 
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entire State, and representatives at the NYS-DoH and NYC-DoHMH to learn about the priorities 
behind the two Programs. After fleshing out the major categories of differences in the quality of 
work practices, occupational community, and regulatory intensity, I interviewed representatives 
from other care coordination programs in the region to gain their perspective on these issues. 
In following a grounded theory approach, I developed initial insights about my research 
question by comparing first interview transcripts, field notes, memos, and available documents. I 
then iteratively developed these initial insights into saturated categories through subsequent 
interviews and by triangulating different perspectives throughout the data generation and 
analysis process. Out of these iterative analyses, I generated two matched case comparisons: one 
between LowQual and MedQual, in which the regulatory intensity of the State-level policy 
program was the same (because both agencies’ programs operated under the NYS-DoH HHP); 
and another one between MedQual and HighQual, where the level of occupational community 
was the same but the regulatory intensity of the policy programs varied (because HighQual 
operated under the NYC-DoHMH CCP while MedQual operated under the NYS-DoH HHP).  
           
4. Findings 
4.1 Differences in Implementing Care Coordination Programs 
The three care management agencies all implemented care coordination programs with 
the same basic spectrum of tasks. These tasks included contacting and enrolling potential 
members in a care coordination program (‘outreach’); then assessing the member’s medical and 
psychosocial history and needs (‘intake’); based on this assessment, drawing up a plan that 
included determining member goals, and how and by when to achieve them (known as a ‘plan of 
care’); providing an extensive range of ongoing care services such as scheduling appointments, 
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arranging documentation and applications for welfare benefits, education about medical and 
behavioral conditions, and arranging other necessary services like transportation, to keep 
members engaged in care and compliant with medical treatments (‘ongoing care’); finally, after 
regularly evaluating a member’s progress towards stated goals, deciding to let the member leave 
the program because he/she is adequately capable of maintaining his/her health (‘graduation’).  
 Despite these similar tasks, the way each agency organized the quality of work practices 
differed considerably (see Table 1), though all agencies employed unlicensed workers as CCs. 
Two factors accounted for the differences between the agencies: whether the agency had an 
occupational community that was effective at promoting higher quality work practices or not, 
and whether the care coordination programs operated under a public policy program that exerted 
a low or high degree of regulatory intensity (see Figure 1). 
LowQual and MedQual both operated under the same NYS-level policy program. 
However, LowQual had a low-skill, low-intensity care model whereas MedQual had a high-skill, 
intermediate intensity model. Because both agencies operated under the same NYS-level policy 
program and thus experienced the same level of regulatory intensity, the reason for these 
differences lay elsewhere: facilitated by the agency’s historical development, the supervisory 
structures, relations with service providers other than CCs, and CCs’ identifications formed an 
occupational community at MedQual that supported higher skill, higher intensity work practices 
than the State-level policy program required. Such an occupational community was absent at 
LowQual, leading to a model that focused more on cost-effectiveness and did not exceed the 
State-level policy program’s minimum requirements.  
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Table 1: Differences in the Quality of Work Practices 
 Specific 
Dimensions 
LowQual 
 
MedQual HighQual 
Skill Level Education 
Levels 
Medical 
Assistant or 
Unrelated 
Background 
Bachelors or 
Masters Degrees 
Bachelors Degrees 
Years of CC 
Experience 
 
<4 Years 
 
>10 Years in 
Behavioral 
Health Care 
Coordination 
 
>10 Years in 
HIV/AIDS Care 
Coordination 
 
Work 
Intensity 
CCs’ Caseloads 50 Cases Plus 10 
Outreach 
45 Cases 15 to 25 Cases 
CCs’ Rate of 
Case 
Conferencing 
Extremely Rare 2 to 3 Per Week 5 to 10 Per Week 
Quality of 
Interactions 
Telephonic, 
Provider Visits 
for Translation 
Telephonic, 
Provider Visits 
for Translation 
and Advocacy, 
Agency Visits 
Telephonic, 
Provider Visits for 
Translation, Agency 
Visits, Home Visits 
Division of 
Labor 
Centralized: CCs 
Responsible for 
Full Spectrum of 
Tasks 
Centralized: CCs 
Responsible for 
Full Spectrum of 
Tasks 
Differentiated: 
Program Director 
and Supervisor also 
Involved in Some 
Tasks 
 
In the case of HighQual, however, I found a care model that had high skill levels like 
MedQual but higher intensity work design than MedQual. HighQual also had an occupational 
community at the workplace level. The difference to MedQual was that HighQual operated under 
a different public policy program. The policy program’s standards mandated and enforced higher 
intensity work practices but it also provided the necessary financial incentives to sustain the low 
caseloads needed for higher intensity work practices. Additionally, HighQual’s occupational 
community enabled case conferencing and promoted normative justifications for higher intensity 
  29 
interactions. The combination of high regulatory intensity and occupational community produced 
the highest quality work practices at HighQual. 
In probing the reasons for these differences in regulatory intensity, I found that the public 
policymakers who designed the higher intensity program did so by drawing on the standards of a 
broader HIV/AIDS community going back to the early 1980s. Their priorities thus included 
realizing the standards and practices of an occupational community focused on HIV/AIDS 
prevention. By contrast, the policymakers chose lower regulatory intensity in the program under 
which LowQual and MedQual operated because they consciously prioritized cost-concerns over 
occupationally-based standards. 
Figure 1: Summary of Findings 
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4.2 The Impact of Occupational Community 
The NYS-DoH HHP, the policy program LowQual and MedQual both operated under,  
provided no mandates or guidelines regarding working conditions, educational qualifications or 
years of experience, except that a person with clinical qualifications (for example a registered 
nurse, licensed clinical social worker or PhD level therapist) (Lead HH Administrator) had to 
oversee the first rendering and subsequent annual reviews of plans of care. While the Program 
provided the documents for the assessment of member needs it did not specify how these should 
translate into a plan of care. Moreover, Program standards prescribed caseloads only for special, 
rare patient populations (Lead HH Quality Analyst), and did not discuss case conferencing. The 
Program standards clearly specified the full spectrum of care coordination tasks but no division 
of labor nor whether these tasks should be performed face-to-face, via letters or telephonically. 
Only for outreach was a home visit required in the third month of trying to enroll a potential 
member but agencies could outsource this home visit to other service providers. At both 
LowQual and MedQual, home visits were rarely needed (HH Director) and if they were, 
someone from outside the agencies (for example a visiting nurse service) did the home visit 
(CC3).  
The Program’s enforcement was also weak and both agencies had never been audited at 
the workplace. The Program’s reimbursement structure also did not provide any incentives for 
higher intensity activities: as long as documentation was sound, agencies showed clinical 
supervision for a member’s first rendering and annual reviews of all plans of care, and CCs 
contacted a member once per month at the very least telephonically, agencies received a flat-rate 
per member per month fee that was not acuity-adjusted during the study period (see section 4.3). 
More than anything else, this reimbursement mechanism provided an incentive to grow the 
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volume of billable contacts and to lower ongoing costs such as labor costs, particularly regarding 
educational qualifications and job classifications (Lead HH Director). Overall, this program 
design meant that the quality of work practices depended on already existing practices and/or on 
how managers decided to define the care model (Lead HH Director). 
Despite this low regulatory intensity applied to both agencies, I found large differences 
between LowQual and MedQual regarding their care coordination program’s work practices. 
This occurred in spite of both agencies formally sharing the same Director and RN clinical 
supervisor. The reason for this was that LowQual conformed with the minimum requirements 
and its supervisory structures and relations with medical providers suppressed the emergence of 
an occupational community in favor of cost concerns and medical compliance. By contrast, 
MedQual’s supervisory structures, relations with other service providers and worker 
identifications established an occupational community that provided a basis for higher 
investment and a higher intensity of services, thus exceeding the NYS-DoH HHP’s minimum 
requirements.   
 
LowQual 
Defining Low Skill and Low Intensity at LowQual 
When the management team at the health system under study decided to participate in the 
NYS-DoH HHP at the beginning of 2012 it decided to house its HH services under existing care 
management agencies rather than to establish a separate structure (HighQual Director). While the 
senior manager responsible for all agencies at the health system I studied consulted the HighQual 
Director regarding how to structure HH services the responsibility for these services fell to 
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another person who decided LowQual’s low-skill, low-intensity model, against the HighQual 
Director’s push for a higher quality model.  
The first Director who established LowQual housed it under a clinic that had little 
experience with care coordination (having only recently implemented light-touch care 
coordination). She established LowQual in March 2012 with a registered nurse who had been at 
the clinic for 15+ years and hired one CC with experience in substance abuse counselling. After 
receiving many members early in 2013 the first Director proceeded to grow the CC team 
gradually until she left in 2014 and LowQual’s second Director continued the initial low-quality 
care model. 
The LowQual Directors chose a low-investment model with a focus on containing labor 
costs. Both Directors chose to define job requirements such that they could hire workers without 
university education, and with no or little previous experience in care coordination. These skill 
requirements meant LowQual could pay their CCs the least of all agencies without any pay 
differentials (see Table 2). LowQual CCs’ care coordination experience ranged between 6 
months and 4 years. Ten of LowQual’s fourteen CCs had either no related backgrounds or were 
medical assistants. Even though medical assistants’ tasks provide relevant knowledge around 
how to interact with physicians and nurses, and how health systems work in general, their work 
has little else to do with care coordination. Among the remaining four CCs, one had a Bachelors 
degree in Health Administration, one was finishing a Bachelors degree in a related field, one was 
a licensed substance abuse counselor and another one was training to become one. Despite these 
higher education levels, these CCs did not receive a higher pay. 
To maximize the highest number of billable contacts a CC could perform in a given 
month while complying with the NYS-DoH HHP’s requirements, the LowQual Directors chose 
  33 
low intensity to complement the low investment. LowQual CCs had the highest caseload among 
all agencies (Table 1). Moreover, after the Director and nurse care manager assigned a member 
to a CC this CC was responsible for all care coordination tasks. Instead of dividing labor across 
different positions in a care coordination team and thus instituting a differentiated division of 
labor, LowQual’s division of labor was centralized. This meant that only one employee had to 
provide an extensive array of services to many members.  
Because of this high workload, the quality of CCs’ interactions with members was often 
low, focusing mostly on telephone calls and assisting high-need members in their visits to 
medical providers on the main hospital campus. These members were high-need because they 
did not speak or write English (they spoke Spanish or were illiterate) or their health had 
deteriorated severely, ending up in the Emergency Room or being admitted. Servicing these 
high-need members around the main campus meant that CCs had to be mobile across the whole 
campus, including the Emergency Room, the Intensive Care Unit, various wards and ambulatory 
clinics. However, their face-to-face interactions ended at the borders of the main hospital campus 
in the sense that they did not accompany members to outside agencies or visit members at home.  
Another consequence of CCs’ low quality interactions was that they engaged medical 
providers the least among all agencies (Table 1). When CCs visited a provider with a member, 
their role was limited to translation or to reinforcing what the provider had said. Case 
conferencing, in which two or more service providers allocate time to discuss the progress of a 
patient’s case, rarely occurred at LowQual. The combination of centralizing all care coordination 
tasks in one position, assigning high caseloads meant that meant that low intensity prevailed at 
LowQual in the form of mostly telephonic interactions, limited provider visits, and a lack of case 
conferencing, agency or home visits.  
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Non-Occupational Supervisory Structures at LowQual 
One reason for the reproduction of this low-skill, low-intensity model at LowQual was 
that its supervisory structures actively inhibited the emergence of occupationally-based practices. 
LowQual’s Director prioritized cost-effectiveness as her main strategy but also suppressed any 
workplace assimilation that may have occurred within LowQual. 
The Director had no previous background in care coordination but instead experience as a 
mid-level Finance Administrator (HH Director). Both LowQual’s licensed social worker and 
HighQual’s Director attributed the low-quality care model to this non-occupational background 
that prioritized cost-effectiveness. The CCs also thought that a reduction of labor costs was the 
reason for LowQual’s model: “we're doing what a lot of case managers and even social workers 
do. And of course they're getting a way bigger salary than we are” (CC3).  
The Director’s stated strategy for LowQual aligned with the NYS-DoH HHP’s minimum 
requirements. It consisted of growing her team to increase the number of LowQual’s members, 
and in turn, the number of LowQual’s billable contacts. LowQual’s Director interpreted the 
regulatory requirements to mean that a telephone call once per month sufficed for payment. 
Additionally, she was planning to increase not just the number of CCs but also each CC’s 
caseload from 50 to 60. Though she was not present at the time of establishing the low-quality 
model she though cost-effectiveness was the reason for designing jobs with low skill and high 
workloads:  
 
“I’m sure the strategic thinking was money-driven. We get paid for every patient per month 
every time we meet the rules. We’re bringing a lot of money into the hospital now…that’s 
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because we keep increasing our population. I never say no to patients… some of the rules are just 
calling them once a month and I’ll still get paid” (HH Director).  
 
Apart from this low-quality job definition, LowQual’s Director was also strongly 
involved in operations by exerting hierarchical control during team meetings held twice per 
week. Because of her lacking care coordination or clinical background, her control limited the 
adoption of occupational values and practices that clinicians at LowQual promoted. These 
clinicians included the registered nurse and a licensed clinical social worker. 
For LowQual’s Director, the nurse and the Operations Supervisor should complement the 
focus on cost-effectiveness by being unconcerned with care standards and instead concerned 
with making sure that process requirements were met. The nurse’s description of her main 
responsibilities aligned with this, consisting mostly of administrative tasks and of little 
interaction with members.   
At times, the Director’s cost-driven strategy clashed with occupational standards that the 
nurse and the licensed social worker advocated. Together with the Operations Supervisor, the 
Director tried to suppress these occupational standards. One clash occurred because the Director 
had decided in early 2016 to start dis-enrolling members who were non-compliant with their 
medication to focus on members that would be easier to manage: 
  
“it’s important that we start graduating the old patients. [The nurse] is from the old school: ‘well, 
they still have an A1C, they haven’t really met their goals’ but they’re not coming to 
appointments, they’re not taking their medication, they’re non-compliant, we’re wasting our 
time” (HH Director). 
 
In this matter, the Operations Supervisor sided with the Director against the nurse: “it's 
not about not taking care of them, it's about getting more patients, making space for new 
patients". The nurse agreed that the practice until early 2016 of keeping members irrespective of 
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their behavior (often for up to 3 years) should be changed. For her, however, the goal was not to 
lower the time spent on members but to graduate them only when they were capable of managing 
their health independently: “we want them to be independent. They can call for their 
appointment. They can manage their medicine…[Graduation] should be after a year, if they are 
good" (HH Nurse). 
I observed the conflict around dis-enrollment in one team meeting. A CC described how 
a new member was “one of those I’m gonna chase around” (CC4) and how she therefore wanted 
to dis-enroll this member when the nurse interrupted her and said she wanted to talk to the 
member. The Director asked her to justify this and the nurse replied: “we need to also take care 
of her”, especially because the member had severe behavioral issues. The Operations Supervisor 
and the Director then asked again what the point would be and the nurse insisted on speaking to 
the member, after which the Director stated the issue should be discussed later.  
The licensed social worker reported several conflict areas and had also filed a grievance 
against the Director. She described their interactions as regular “headbutting”, particularly 
because the Director did not understand clinical issues. She expressed a strong professional 
identity stating that “social work has really always done care coordination” and that social 
workers should be “agents of change in someone’s life” rather than only checking in with 
members telephonically. She doubted whether CCs had the education and experience to be 
change agents. Moreover, she criticized the lack of home visits at LowQual because home visits 
allowed a CC to argue more persuasively for what a member needs. She cited the example of a 
member who might refuse a home attendant but might repeatedly fall due to an untidy home. A 
home visit would let the CC know that the root of the member’s poor health outcomes was 
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his/her poor living circumstances. This would provide a better basis for convincing members of 
necessary services.  
The final conflict area was how the weekly team meetings proceeded. The licensed social 
worker felt they included little discussion about clinical issues. My observations of team 
meetings confirmed this assessment. The Director used meetings to exert her own hierarchical 
control rather than to develop better care practices. In one instance, the Director asked a CC why 
a member had missed two appointments. The CC explained some of the communication issues 
he was facing with the member. The Director then repeated the initial question to which the CC 
replied he was now arranging more convenient appointments. The Director repeated the question 
again after which a more experienced CC explained that scheduling the appointments more 
conveniently would run into procedural issues and was therefore not an adequate solution. The 
CC under question then admitted his ignorance of the procedures after which the Director let the 
issue go and moved on to questioning another CC. In this instance, it was not the Director who 
had offered the criticism based on effective work practices. Instead, the Director kept prodding 
the CC until he gave up defending his past work behavior and accepted her criticism. 
The Operations Supervisor, who was the program’s first CC and promoted three years 
into the program, tended to support the Director. His work consisted of ensuring compliance with 
the State’s process outcomes and providing on-the-job training that he derived from his work 
experience at LowQual. While he also mentioned taking care of members as the HH’s main aim, 
he connected this aim to efficiency and compliance with program requirements as opposed to 
viewing care as an end in itself, as the nurse did: “we understand the importance of getting that 
paperwork done…because the more we do that right, the more money we're going to get…we're 
getting money so that we can take care of the patient efficiently” (HH Supervisor). Moreover, the 
  38 
Operations Supervisor emphasized that his training focused on what was needed to get the job 
done. Because LowQual’s care model consisted of telephonic interactions with many members 
CCs needed to manage their time well but also try to build trust with members. The lack of 
alternative sources of information regarding the psychosocial roots of a member’s medical issues 
made the issue of trust particularly salient for LowQual’s Supervisor:  
 
“The two most important things to being successful is to build the trust with the patient and to 
understand time management...because like I said, patients are hard to trust and in the 
environment we're in, we're in the ghetto, we're in humble surroundings. And trust is big…once 
you lost that trust, now you're gonna be spinning your wheels, because I'm not answering my 
phone, I don't trust you”.  
 
While the nurse and licensed social worker expressed care and advocacy principles as a 
basis for higher intensity practices like ongoing follow-ups or home visits, the Operations 
Supervisor’s training focused on efficient procedural skills and the lack of face-to-face 
interaction with members. Moreover, in his attitudes and practices he supported the Director’s 
strategy of growing member volumes.    
 
Paternalist Relations with Medical Providers at LowQual 
Another element that inhibited higher intensity work practices such as case conferencing 
and more engaging provider visits was that LowQual’s CCs had mainly paternalist relations with 
physicians. CCs in all agencies clearly drew lines between their work and the clinical work of 
physicians, nurses or licensed social workers, and therefore subordinated themselves to these 
professionals’ authority concerning clinical questions. However, at LowQual physicians were 
paternalist in the sense that only few physicians viewed CCs as helpful for communication 
purposes and for feeding information that patients would not tell physicians. CCs often stated 
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that most physicians did not know what they did, that care coordination roles existed, and some 
questioned CCs’ value. Accordingly, physicians only rarely took time to case conference with 
CCs or engage with them in a more extended way in provider visits. Paternalist relations thus 
inhibited the physicians’ support of an occupational community. Moreover, they also inhibited 
learning from physicians about anything more than medical compliance which justifies no other 
work practices but reminding members of medical appointments and medication regimes. 
One factor for this lack of buy-in from physicians was the lack of mechanisms to create 
awareness (Physician 1) or educate physicians about care coordination services (CC5). Because 
LowQual started growing its team around 12 months after its inception there were few people in 
the beginning to associate with the program (HH Nurse). Moreover, though a clinic within the 
health system’s hospital housed LowQual, CCs’ offices were in an administrative building that 
was separate from the clinic and from hospital wards. This meant that rather than having a 
regular presence within a clinic or the main hospital campus, CCs turned up in clinics and wards 
irregularly and only in relation to specific hospital patients, thus putting a limit on their ability to 
build relationships with physicians. Another factor is that LowQual’s Director had not actively 
promoted CCs throughout the health system to clarify their function. The Director was aware 
that this was problematic but she interpreted the problem to be that physicians did not refer 
potential members to LowQual as much as they would if they supported the program. In 
response, the Director had put up posters but this was ineffective (HH Director).  
This lack of physician awareness meant that physicians did not want to allocate time to 
case conference with CCs. Moreover, it meant that only few physicians were receptive to 
engaging with CCs. Even in these instances, however, physicians saw CCs’ value as limited: 
“it’s not having a personal assistant [as physicians initially thought], it’s to understand the 
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culture…and a second person to explain [physicians’ treatments] (Physician Manager). One 
physician expected CCs to be more qualified and take on a clinical role but then adjusted his 
expectations. For this more receptive physician, CCs’ work was mostly a function of his own 
medical work rather than a contribution in itself: “it’s like an extended hand that you have for the 
care of the patient in the world outside” (Physician 2).  
Moreover, most interactions between CCs and physicians concerned a member’s medical 
compliance, i.e. how compliant the patient was with physicians’ treatments (Physician 1). This 
reinforced CCs’ work exclusively as a function of physician authority and inhibited learning 
about other principles relevant for care coordination such as a member’s emotional stability. CCs 
interacting only with physicians, physicians’ lack of awareness and physician paternalism 
inhibited case conferencing, more intensive physician engagement or the promotion of principles 
other than medical compliance. 
 
Non-Occupational Worker Identifications at LowQual 
CCs’ values and goals also indicated LowQual’s lack of occupational community. 
Because the Director hired CCs with little social work related education or experience they had 
neither been socialized into advocating social work principles nor had they experienced the 
utility of higher intensity practices before taking on their CC roles. They therefore lacked the 
occupational values that may have been the basis for higher intensity work practices. Instead, 
they drew on physicians’ focus on medical compliance and the Director’s and the Operations 
Supervisor’s focus on cost-effectiveness to orient their work practices.  
LowQual CCs’ main goals were to enforce medical compliance and reduce ER visits and 
hospitalizations. To attain compliance, CCs needed to build trust with members. However, 
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because of their high caseloads CCs could only do this through telephonic interactions and 
sporadic face-to-face interactions. This was problematic because many members suffered from 
behavioral issues rooted in their living environments that undermined both their medical 
compliance and their relationships with CCs, and could lead to severe consequences such as an 
ER visit or being admitted. Uninformed and unknowing of the psychosocial causes of members’ 
inability to be medically compliant, CCs engaged in recurrent attempts to build trust that the 
persistent psychosocial causes would undermine instead of trying to deal with the causes 
themselves. These ruptures explicated the limitations of CCs’ work: “without members’ 
willingness] we’re at the same place as without [the CCs]” (Physician 1).  
For the CCs, members’ bouts of non-compliance also undermined their ability to view 
their work as part of a broader occupation, especially because they could not observe members’ 
behaviors at home:  
 
“It's a battle. One month we're controlling this and then this month: 'I don't wanna do this 
anymore! I wanna eat what I wanna eat!' or they just start going to the ER instead of coming 
in…some patients are saying they are following what they have to do but sometimes they're not. 
Maybe they're not compliant with medications, I mean, we're not there to tell if you are” (CC6). 
 
Accordingly, the CCs did not identify as social workers and referred to members as 
‘patients’. One CC even identified using the term ‘patients’ as opposed to the social work 
occupation: “it's because we at a hospital…I guess it's out of habit. I mean, mainly I see social 
workers who will call them a client” (CC6). These identifications created an opposition to the 
licensed clinical social worker rather than a community aimed at the same goals and sharing 
common practices. 
Because CCs could not draw on their own previous experience, education, or interactions 
with clinical providers other than paternalist physicians, inhibited to a great deal by non-
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occupational supervisory structures, no occupational community that could promote higher 
quality work practices ever emerged at LowQual. 
MedQual 
The Development and Reproduction of High Skill, Intermediate Intensity at MedQual 
 
Around the same time as LowQual was being established in early 2012, the health system 
downsized its behavioral health services and laid off workers in behavioral health clinics. 
However, the management team that established LowQual also decided to assign six workers 
who had previously been case managers or intake workers at a behavioral health clinic to 
MedQual. The decision to establish MedQual at a behavioral health clinic and with workers who 
had been employed there accounts to a great degree for MedQual’s high skill levels, and it also 
facilitated intermediate intensity work practices. The reason was that MedQual had been 
established among an existing occupational community based on behavioral health. Additionally, 
occupationally-based supervisory structures ensured the continuity of MedQual’s high-skill, 
intermediate intensity model. 
First, in terms of skill, a licensed clinical social worker who ran the behavioral health 
clinic recruited the workers with an emphasis on high educational qualifications, including field-
related university degrees, 10+ years prior to their transfer into MedQual. At the behavioral 
health clinic, the workers had fulfilled roles that were similar to CC roles, providing them with a 
lot of useful experience. MedQual CCs had worked as intake workers who evaluated the needs of 
walk-in patients and referred them to the appropriate services (CC1).  
Regarding intensity, like LowQual, MedQual also had a centralized division of labor but 
other than that, it achieved an intermediate level of intensity. Supportive supervisory structures 
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and CCs having established receptive relationships with clinical providers enabled an 
intermediate level of case conferencing and advocacy during provider visits (Table 1). Moreover, 
facilitated by lower caseloads, CCs drew on their identifications with social work principles to 
engage in more intensive interactions with members such as agency visits. Together, 
occupationally-based supervisory structures, receptive relations with clinical providers, and CCs’ 
identifications formed an occupational community that facilitated more intensive work practices 
than the NYS-DoH HHP prescribed. 
 
Occupationally-Based Supervisory Structures at MedQual 
While MedQual’s Operations Supervisor formally reported to the LowQual’s Director, 
the Director had little day-to-day involvement in MedQual’s operations. The Supervisor 
consulted the Director via email or telephone when she needed to but in the day-to-day 
operations, the Supervisor ran MedQual autonomously. The same nurse that sat with the 
LowQual staff was also formally responsible for MedQual’s CCs but they interacted with her 
mostly via short telephone calls. This permitted MedQual to operate largely autonomously from 
LowQual’s supervisory staff. Moreover, this autonomy permitted MedQual to be part of an 
occupational community based on behavioral health principles. 
The main reason for MedQual being embedded in an occupational community was that 
the behavioral health clinic that housed MedQual was located separately from the main hospital 
campus where LowQual staff sat. Therefore, MedQual staff interacted with behavioral health 
clinic staff rather than with hospital staff, especially in monthly meetings with all behavioral 
health clinic staff, which gave them a visible presence in the clinic. The clinic had its own 
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inpatient beds, along with other psychiatric services across several floors, one of which 
contained MedQual’s offices.  
MedQual’s Supervisor actively promoted links to the clinic and exerted occupationally-
based management through her management style and support for social work principles. 
MedQual’s Operations Supervisor interacted regularly with the clinic’s Director (who was a 
licensed clinical social worker) based on whether the therapist or psychiatrist along with the 
clinic’s Director deemed MedQual’s services as beneficial for a patient. The clinic’s Director had 
no formal supervisory responsibility over MedQual staff but the Operations Supervisor 
emphasized that the clinic’s Director was particularly important in referring and handing over a 
potential member to the Operations Supervisor. This meant that most referrals to MedQual came 
from within the behavioral health clinic so that MedQual CCs did not have to outreach potential 
members, which lowered MedQual caseloads. Additionally, the Operations Supervisor insisted 
on lower caseloads because she wanted to maintain appropriate care standards rather than grow 
patient volume: “To me it's not necessarily caseloads per se, it’s the quality of the work”.  
At the time of her arrival, the Operations Supervisor chose to reproduce the existing 
practices through delegated management, rather than to discourage CCs from engaging in more 
intensive work practices. Moreover, her background and values reinforced rather than inhibited 
social work principles. 
The Supervisor had studied a sociological discipline, and worked 10+ years as a case 
manager where she coordinated the care of children, families and parolees. After that, she 
managed healthcare projects, including a multi-year project related to care coordination with a 
large team. Through these experiences, the Supervisor had developed a delegated management 
style in which her main function was to support her staff in autonomous working.  
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The Supervisor applied this management style at MedQual. She described her role as 
having to ensure adequate documentation and sometimes supporting the CCs with difficult cases. 
But for her, the CCs’ extensive years of experience meant they would often have a better 
understanding of how to proceed with a case such that the Supervisor often deferred to CCs’ 
judgement. Instead of coercive team meetings, she practiced an open-door policy that meant 
continuous interaction with CCs in addition to individual meetings every two weeks. This 
management style meant effective standards were often at CCs’ discretion, so while the 
minimum standard was one contact per month the standard CC practiced was to contact members 
twice or three times per month, not only once. Moreover, CCs also engaged in agency visits and 
advocated for patients at provider visits (Table 1), which the Supervisor supported. 
The occupational basis of supervisory structures also manifested itself in the Supervisor’s 
values. She embedded care coordination’s value in a psychosocial model in environmental 
factors determined health. Moreover, she emphasized the importance of advocating for members 
and of helping them empower themselves to demand transparency from physicians:  
 
“A lot of times clients are afraid to demand services…just because you're poor …I tell 
'clients' you have the right, the patients' bill of rights is very important. The exchange is: 'I am the 
client and you're my provider, you're providing!' [laughs], 'Provide!'”.   
 
Her priority of providing care manifested in her lacking awareness of reimbursement. She 
knew one contact per month was a requirement but thought it more of a minimum standard than 
a requirement for reimbursement: 
 
“These are the minimum standards in terms of what's required in health homes. How that 
translates into funds I have no idea. I really don't, I don't know how much we get paid or how 
many people we bill for. So I guess that overall I wanna make sure that the clients are doing 
well. For me, it's not, I shouldn't say this, but the monetary is secondary to their wellbeing”.  
  46 
 
Instead of focusing on cost-effectiveness, her focus on care thus reinforced, rather than 
inhibited, more intensive face-to-face interactions with members. It also contributed to receptive 
relations with clinical providers in the behavioral health clinic. 
 
Receptive Relations with Medical and other Providers at MedQual 
While LowQual CCs interacted mostly with physicians, MedQual CCs interacted 
regularly with psychiatrists and therapists – in addition to primary care physicians. The CCs 
described their interactions with other service providers as receptive. In addition to the clinic’s 
Director and MedQual’s Supervisor, clinical providers thus also formed part of the occupational 
community that supported MedQual’s more intensive work practices.  
CCs attributed this receptive relationship to their backgrounds of having worked at the 
clinic in similar roles for many years. The responsibilities of these previous roles were more 
limited, meaning they had to work more closely with other providers to accomplish them. This 
background meant that all physicians, and therapists had more familiar and reiterative relations 
with the CCs which permitted the second highest rate of case conferencing amongst all programs 
(Table 1). When CCs needed to case conference with a provider, mostly to draw up the first plan 
of care but also when a difficult situation arose with a member or when members were 
discharged and a follow-up appointment needed to be scheduled (CC7), these providers were 
receptive to the CCs:  
 
“when a case is assigned to me…the first thing I do is actually call the therapist...I've been 
working here for [10+] years, so a lot of people know me, so I'll say: 'Hi how are you doing? It's 
me, [CC1’s name], I was assigned one of your clients so and so, can you give me a little bit of 
history or tell me where do you feel that I can assist this client?’” (CC1). 
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Even though there were preceding relations between CCs and providers, there was still 
some confusion about what the CCs would do in the behavioral health clinic. In particular, 
boundaries between therapists and CCs were unclear. Drawing on her previous experience of 
managing care coordination projects, MedQual’s Supervisor responded to this uncertainty by 
explaining the services’ aim and scope to providers in the behavioral health clinic. She had also 
had interactions with providers at the behavioral health clinic in her previous capacity as project 
manager which facilitated buy-in from physicians (MedQual Supervisor). This work to define 
boundaries and educate providers helped reduce resistance from providers and clarify 
misunderstandings:  
 
“now the majority of the psychiatrists, and I mean with exception if they're new, right? They 
have a better understanding. And [MedQual Supervisor] has made it her business to introduce 
health homes, speak with the Units, speak with the therapists…explaining what role we play. 
What is it that we can do, what we're not able to do. What role continues to be 
theirs…sometimes that's a misconception, not only of the therapist but also of the client. So she's 
made it possible for that, to have an understanding in what role we play" (CC1). 
 
Accordingly, the MedQual CCs did two to three case conferences on average per week 
with psychiatrists and therapists. This occurred when drawing up or adjusting a plan of care. If 
the CC had not been able to contact a member for extended periods of time a case conference 
also took place with the Supervisor and the member’s therapist to ascertain whether a member 
was at risk of endangering him/herself or others. These receptive relations allowed not only for 
easier case conferencing but it also meant some physicians started asking for CCs in their 
medical record notes (MedQual Supervisor). Through case conferences, clinical providers also 
reinforced a focus on behavioral health instead of just on medical compliance. This provided 
clinical justifications for higher intensity practices like agency visits.  
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Furthermore, these receptive relations also meant provider visits had a different character. 
While CCs helped with communication they could also advocate for physicians to explain results 
more clearly: “He has to explain it to you in laymen's terms, not in a medical term…if I go with 
[members] I say: 'Doctor, can you please explain it to her like you're talking to a five-year old?' 
and I've been pretty successful with some, not all” (CC7).      
Instead of functioning solely as an extension of physicians’ authority, CCs were thus 
often able to defend their members’ interests and actively engage physicians. 
 
Occupational Worker Identifications at MedQual 
In addition to supervisory structures and clinical providers, CCs’ own identifications with 
social work principles such as advocacy meant they were also committed to this occupational 
community. This motivated them to engage in more intensive interactions with members. CCs 
referred to members as ‘clients’ rather than ‘patients’ citing their location in a behavioral health 
clinic as the reason. Moreover, additional to improving compliance, they aimed at improving a 
member’s position related to their social environment. Their main goal was to help members 
become independent, not just from the HH, but in general. Accordingly, they knew of and 
offered a broader range of resources such as literacy classes, interpreting these as contributing to 
better health.  
MedQual CCs also viewed their knowledge of resources as a factor setting them apart 
from other providers. It made them view themselves as part of a broader social group and helped 
them find pride in their occupation:  
 
“It's not the same thing you going to therapy and telling your therapist: 'Oh, you know, Section 8 
is this'…it's not that the therapist doesn't wanna help but the therapist doesn't have the knowledge 
that we have about the different resources that are available. How to communicate with these 
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different agencies, so you see we have that power. And we already have that experience, and we 
know where and with who to speak with. That's one of the things that I think that's not being 
acknowledged…but that has to be acknowledged. That we in reality are a powerful group” 
(CC1). 
 
Based on their previous experiences and their identifications, MedQual CCs engaged in 
more intensive face-to-face interaction with members. For example, at their offices, they made 
phone calls in front of members to help them feel less isolated and to reduce their emotional 
stress. CCs also accompanied members to outside agencies, for example to the Human Resources 
Administration or to the housing court if these institutions reviewed members’ benefits. These 
visits often consumed up to a whole work day. Moreover, they extended CCs’ mobility beyond 
their clinic. CCs engaged in such intensive practices to manage their members’ emotional states: 
 
“they need someone there because they get very nervous or the anxiety of being in a crowded 
place with too many people, too much noise that sets in. So you have to be able to like: 'It's ok, 
you know we're going to this big place but you're there for one reason, so don't get upset…I've 
found guys that's like: 'Oh we've been here for an hour!', 'No we've only been here 10 minutes', 
'Oh it feels like an hour!', 'I understand', so I have to like tone it down” (CC7). 
 
MedQual’s supervisory structures, receptive relations with other providers, and CCs’ 
identifications constituted an occupational community that enabled MedQual CCs to provide 
higher intensity services compared to LowQual’s lacking occupational community (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  50 
Table 2: The Structure of Occupational Community 
Community 
Dimensions 
LowQual MedQual 
Supervisory 
Structures 
• inhibiting social work or 
other care principles 
• promoting cost-
effectiveness 
• unable to support buy-in 
from clinical providers 
• promoting social work or 
other care principles 
• deprioritizing cost-
effectiveness 
• able to support buy-in from 
clinical providers 
CCs’ Relations with 
Providers 
• resistance from clinical 
providers 
• paternalism 
• focus on medical 
compliance 
• little resistance from clinical 
providers 
• willingness to engage 
• skills transfers focused on 
emotional awareness 
Worker Identifications • derived from low-
intensity work process 
• function of physician 
authority 
• opposed to social work 
principles 
• derived from experience and 
interactions with providers 
• identification as a powerful 
group with unique skills base 
• identification with social 
work principles 
 
 4.3 The Impact of Regulatory Intensity 
 
While MedQual’s occupational community improved the quality of work practices 
compared to LowQual, MedQual still had lower intensity services than HighQual. MedQual had 
similar skill levels but many work practices were lacking or at a lower level of intensity 
compared to HighQual. HighQual had frequent home visits that could include crisis intervention, 
higher rates of case conferencing, a differentiated division of labor, a set health promotion 
curriculum, and low caseloads (Table 1).  
These differences were far from trivial but created high work effort throughout the care 
team through intensive interactions between care providers and members, and among care 
providers. Home visits were particularly time-consuming, potentially dangerous, and stressful 
because CCs had to enter neighborhoods and buildings in which illicit activity such as drug deals 
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might be occurring. Home visits also enabled CCs to intervene in crisis situations at a member’s 
home to prevent a member’s health from deteriorating severely, at the cost of having to make 
stressful judgement calls. At a recent visit, a HighQual CC had to intervene because a member 
was intoxicated and close to being unresponsive: “She was on the floor…The patient tell me: 
'You don't have to, I'm all right'. I said: 'You're not all right because if I leave you and something 
happens to you, I'm sorry'…I had to call the ambulance” (CC2).  
The differences in intensity lay in different public policy program designs (see Table 3). 
The NYC-DoHMH CCP clearly specified and mandated the higher intensity work practices. 
However, it also underpinned these high standards with strong enforcement and a supportive 
reimbursement mechanism. By contrast, such high regulatory intensity was missing in the design 
of the program under which LowQual and MedQual operated. Additionally, a workplace-level 
occupational community at HighQual accounted for high skill levels and provided normative 
justifications to rigorously follow the CCP standards.    
As mentioned above, the NYS-DoH HHP, the policy program under which LowQual and 
MedQual operated, had low regulatory intensity. In its standard-setting, it did not specify many 
important aspects of work organization such as minimum qualifications for CCs, caseloads, or 
clinical oversight of CCs other than to sign off on assessments and plans of care. While the 59-
page provider manual emphasized a care team approach the closest it came to specifying work 
organization was the following sentence, generally describing a care manager’s role: “The 
coordination of a member’s care is done through a dedicated care manager who oversees and 
coordinates access to all of the services a member requires in order to facilitate optimum member 
health status” (NYS-DoH 2014: 9). The HHP paid participating organizations a per member per 
month fee that was not adjusted for acuity and only required one contact per month with a 
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program member that fell under ongoing care tasks (including also the lowest intensity of a 
phone call).  
The HHP’s enforcement structure was also weak, consisting of few audits and 
decentralized monitoring. Audits consisted of certifying a health system to provide infrastructure 
services (for example IT reporting tools and billing) to care management agencies before the 
program’s inception and then again every three years after that. The infrastructure provider was a 
‘Lead Health Home’ while the care management agencies that received infrastructure services 
from the Lead Health Home were called ‘Downstream Providers’. As part of this recertification 
process, the State audited few patient charts and only from a small proportion of a Lead Health 
Home’s Downstream Providers. It was also only these few Downstream Providers that the State 
auditors visited. In terms of monitoring, the Lead Health Home liaised with the NYS-DoH and 
monitored Downstream Providers. The required monitoring data did not include quality 
measures, only simple process measures such as the length of time taken to enroll a potential 
member: “The State monitors a lot of busy work and not results, like any cost reductions” (Lead 
HH Finance Manager). Data on health outcomes were unavailable because managed care 
organizations owned these and the NYS-DoH had not developed quality reporting for the HHP 
(Lead HH Director; Lead HH Quality Analyst). 
The result of this low regulatory intensity was that Lead Health Home administrators had 
to design their own standards to a large degree, in turn resulting in a large diversity of forms of 
work organization at the workplace level. The Lead Health Home that housed LowQual and 
MedQual tended to exceed the HHP’s standards for process monitoring but did not go so far as 
to monitor quality. For example, at their own initiative, Lead Health Home Administrators 
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decided to provide Downstream Providers with benchmarking reports to inform them of their 
performance on these process measures (Senior Lead HH Administrator).  
Another result of low regulatory intensity was that there were no explicit standards for 
health homes to graduate patients (Lead HH Administrative Assistant; Lead HH Quality 
Analyst), leading to “indefinite care coordination” (Policy Program Chief Medical Officer). 
Furthermore, audits had little workplace effects and did not engender buy-in from participating 
organizations. When the State recertified the Lead Health Home that housed LowQual and 
MedQual the State audited 70 charts (from multiple thousands of members that the Lead Health 
Home structure managed) from only a third of the Lead Health Home’s Downstream Providers. 
One of the Directors whose agency had been audited recalled successfully contesting the State’s 
changes and furthermore felt the State criticized his team without proper grounds: “We were 
being held to standards we didn’t know existed”. 
By contrast to the HHP’s low regulatory intensity, the NYC-DoHMH Care Coordination 
Program, the policy program under which HighQual operated, exerted high regulatory intensity. 
It clearly specified high standards of work organization, enforced them intensively, and paid 
more for higher intensity services.  
Regarding work organization, the CCP’s provider manual included a section entitled 
‘Roles and Responsibilities’ that clearly defined the Program Director’s, Operations 
Supervisor’s, CC’s and Medical Provider’s roles, as well as the specialized division of care 
coordination tasks among all team members of the care coordination program (NYC-DoHMH 
2015: 22–26). As a justification, the section discussed taking over other team members’ 
responsibilities to more effectively engage members, which was similar to the Operations 
Supervisor’s interpretation of why it was beneficial for her to be involved in the initial 
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assessments and plans of care for program members. HighQual implemented this specialized 
division of labor as follows: after HighQual’s Director and a physician assigned a patient to the 
CCP, the CCP Program Director collected all patient information and passed the case to the 
Operations Supervisor who then met with the patient to introduce the program, enroll the patient, 
do the initial assessments and start drawing up a care plan. In parallel, the Program Director 
assigned the member to a CC who reviewed the care plan and took over ongoing care tasks for 
the member. In this way, multiple team members knew and interacted with the member, which 
allowed the Program Director or Operations Supervisor to take over ongoing care tasks if CCs 
were not present at the clinic to attend to their members.  
While the Program did not mandate qualifications or caseloads a separate appendix with 
a staffing plan recommended degrees and experience levels for supervisory staff, college 
education, “strong socio-cultural identification with the target population” (NYC-DoHMH 2015: 
82) for CCs, and caseloads of 14 to 20 cases. Again, HighQual’s care model aligned well with 
these recommendations, though caseloads sometimes went up to 25.  
Regarding HighQual’s frequent case conferences (Table 1), the CCP standards required a 
case conference with the member’s primary care physician at least once per quarter but also 
when a medical appointment generated information relevant to a member’s plan of care and 
when significant events occurred “e.g. loss of housing, pregnancy, etc.” (NYC-DoHMH 2015: 
39). Moreover, they should occur if providers outside of the CCP clinic needed information. The 
NYC-DoHMH provided a form to document these case conferences but informal case 
conferences should occur “as frequently as needed” (NYC-DoHMH 2015: 40) without 
documentation. Accordingly, HighQual CCs case conferenced not only when drawing up or 
revising a plan of care but also after a member’s visit to the clinic. Moreover, these frequent case 
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conferences allowed CCs not only to help with communication issues but also to give non-
clinical input into a member’s care, giving their input a value separate from medical authority. 
Other standards that were higher than the HHP included an outline of both social as well 
as medical criteria for graduation, and mandating members conclude an 18-topic health 
promotion curriculum the NYC-DoHMH supplied (NYC-DoHMH 2015: 58f.). 
With regard to interactions between CCs and members, the NYC-DoHMH CCP specified 
that CCs should accompany members to all health and social services appointments as needed 
(accounting for provider and agency visits) but it also mandated home visits for the highest needs 
members that included the CCs observing members take their medication once per day (known 
as ‘directly observed therapy’ or DOT). Most importantly, the CCP tied the frequency and 
intensity of interactions with members to a member’s acuity level and to the height of 
reimbursements. The higher a member’s acuity was (defined by HIV viral loads but also by 
psychosocial barriers like substance abuse or homelessness) the more frequent and intensive the 
services should be. Additionally, the more intensive the services were the higher the 
reimbursement was that agencies received for those services. The CCP conceptualized this 
combination of acuity, intensity and payment levels as different tracks. The most intensive of 
these tracks included DOT and generated a separate payment for each documented, direct 
observation in addition to a per member per month fee. The second most intensive included a 
face-to-face meeting once per week with a review of medication charts members kept and 
generated a lower payment additional to the per member per month fee. The third track included 
one monthly face-to-face meeting and the least intensive track included quarterly face-to-face 
meetings.   
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At HighQual, this track structure clearly signaled a member’s acuity to the CCs and 
meant that a CC’s caseload included different frequencies for interacting with members face-to-
face. CCs usually had between 1 to 3 members who fell into the highest acuity DOT track. 
Moreover, the requirement that all members go through the 18-topic health promotion 
curriculum before graduating meant that CCs engaged even the lowest acuity program members 
face-to-face over an extended period of time, keeping these members engaged in care.   
In addition to providing incentives for more intensive services, the track structure had the 
workplace effect of encouraging members to cycle through the program relative to their acuity, 
rather than indefinitely staying with the program, as was the case in the low-intensity HHP. The 
HighQual Director interpreted the track structure as promoting a focus on seeking out and 
helping high-needs members: “In order to have a care coordination program that's going to be 
financially viable you really have to make sure that you have quite a lot of people in the higher 
paying tracks and that as you're moving people to the lower paying tracks you really try to make 
sure you get referrals in”. 
In terms of enforcement, the CCP also followed a high intensity approach. First, 
monitoring requirements were higher. While the NYS-DoH HHP had no paperwork 
requirements, the CCP separated reporting via electronic means from documentation, defined as 
paperwork. This paperwork was retained for each member for six years after contract 
reconciliation (NYC-DoHMH 2015: 59). Additionally, documentation was required more often, 
also for directly observed therapy, case conferencing and health promotion activities. While the 
HHP collected no quality outcomes the NYC-DoHMH established an electronic system called 
‘eSHARE’ in 2012 which collected individual client-level health outcomes data and which 
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Federal administrators declared a best practice (HRSA 2014a: 13). These data were the basis for 
reports that benchmarked all CCP agencies.  
Second, participation in the CCP depended on a contract, renewed yearly, between every 
service provider and the NYC-DoHMH. This contract-based arrangement put more pressure on 
service providers to meet standards than the recertification every three years of only the Lead 
Health Home in the NYS-DoH HHP.  
Third, audits occurred not only electronically to check for appropriate documentation but 
every year at the beginning of the contract an NYC-DoHMH representative audited service 
providers through workplace visits. Two months later, a representative from Public Health 
Solutions (a consultancy with experience in HIV/AIDS contract management since 1991) also 
did a workplace audit, and towards the end of the contract, both representatives did a workplace 
audit together (CCP Program Director; HighQual Director). Moreover, four years into the 
Program, an independent agency also audited work practices (HighQual Director). 
HighQual staff described this intensive audit structure as an opportunity to engage with 
auditors and improve their own performance, which generated their support for the CCP. 
Especially useful were the benchmarking reports that showed variation among all CCP agencies’ 
performance (CCP Official) and HighQual as one of the top CCP performers. Moreover, 
HighQual staff described their interactions with auditors as a reiterative ‘back-and-forth’ in 
which proper justifications from both sides could be voiced. At a recent audit, these reiterative 
interactions allowed the Program Director to explain particular charts clearly and reach a 
common understanding with the auditors.  
 
 
  58 
Table 3: The Structures of Low and High Regulatory Intensity 
Regulatory 
Dimension 
Low: NYS-DoH HHP High: NYC-DoHMH CCP 
Standard Setting • No specifications of: 
education, experience, 
roles, case conferencing, 
division of labor 
• Low minimum standard 
for number and quality of 
interactions with members 
• Caseloads only for special 
populations 
• Specifications of: roles, 
number and quality of 
interactions tied to 
member acuity, when to 
case conference, 
differentiated division of 
labor 
• Recommended: 
education, experience 
and caseloads 
Enforcement of 
Standards 
• No workplace audits at 
LowQual or MedQual 
• Only process outcomes 
monitored 
• Decentralized monitoring 
via Lead Health Homes 
• Three workplace audits 
per year at HighQual 
• Individual patient-level 
health outcomes 
monitored in addition to 
processes 
• Centralized Monitoring 
by DoHMH and 
consulting firm 
 
Financial Incentives • Unadjusted per member 
per month fee: incentive 
to reduce labor costs and 
increase number of 
enrolled members 
• Per member per month 
fee for lowest intensity 
services and additional 
payments staggered 
according to intensity: 
incentive to seek out 
higher-risk members  
 
 
HighQual 
Occupational Community at HighQual 
While the CCP’s high regulatory intensity accounted for HighQual’s high-intensity 
practices, HighQual also had an occupational community that shaped its high skill levels and 
provided normative justifications for following the CCP standards. The latter was particularly 
important because the CCP regulations did not directly generate physician buy-in (for example 
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by tying reimbursement to their participation) nor did they mandate required work experience or 
qualifications (though it did recommend them). The fact that HighQual was among the CCP’s 
highest performing agencies indicates further that occupational community is necessary to 
underpin the CCP’s high regulatory intensity.  
Similar to MedQual, HighQual’s occupational community also consisted of occupationally-based 
supervisory structures, receptive provider relations, and workers’ identifications with the social 
work occupation. The Center’s Director had 15+ years’ experience working in the HIV/AIDS 
field, including before the advent of highly active anti-retro viral therapies which turned 
HIV/AIDS from a likely fatal, acute to a potentially long-term, chronic disease. He spent several 
years as an administrator in HIV/AIDS care coordination before joining the health system under 
study. Moreover, he engaged in the broader HIV/AIDS community by chairing regional 
initiatives to promote HIV/AIDS prevention. The Director brought this strong occupational 
experience and commitment to bear in his role. 
HighQual was located at an AIDS Center with many years of previous experience in care 
coordination. When the Center won the CCP contract in 2010 the Director created a new job 
classification that included university education and several years’ experience in HIV/AIDS care 
coordination. The Director did this despite Human Resources suggesting he take the lower-paid, 
lower skill job classification that the LowQual CCs subsequently had. The Director emphasized 
multiple years of experience in care coordination when recruiting CCs because he thought it was 
necessary to know the population’s health needs, the resources to deal with them, and how to 
draw up a plan of care that factored in the timelines within which those resources could be 
procured. Accordingly, he hired CCs with many years of experience in HIV/AIDS care 
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coordination (see Table 1). Additionally, both the Program Director and Operations Supervisor 
also had 10+ years’ relevant experience.  
The Director’s strong involvement in the daily operations of the clinic also meant he 
promoted the HighQual care coordination program as a valuable part of the clinic’s overall 
functioning, facilitating provider buy-in for case conferences. The Director did the visit planning 
for every work week which entailed looking at all patients coming in for appointments, 
evaluating them for different services based on the patient’s medical and psychosocial progress, 
and suggesting physicians refer patients to these services at the weekly pre-visit planning 
meeting. Sometimes the Director would put patients into HighQual’s CCP even without 
physician approval and receive physician approval afterwards. He was thus involved not only in 
such decisions but sometimes also overrode physicians’ authority. At the same time, he was able 
to ensure that physicians understood a patient’s need for care coordination, which made them 
willing to engage in case conferences with CCs. 
One issue that sometimes occurred was when physicians referred patients to CCP but did 
not emphasize its voluntary nature and that a team of care coordination staff would provide 
services. This meant members sometimes did not understand care coordination’s value. 
However, the CCP Supervisor found that referring to previous members’ good experiences 
helped her convince potential members of care coordination’s value. 
In addition to facilitating receptive provider relations, the Director also articulated a 
psychosocial model of health, had extensive knowledge of community providers and resources, 
emphasized patient-centered care and the importance of cross-checking what patients reported 
with home visits as well as information from diagnostic tests. From his previous work in other 
sites he recounted multiple moments at which home visits revealed a crucial piece of information 
  61 
that accounted for a patient’s inability to engage in medical care, including illiteracy, domestic 
violence, dementia or schizophrenia. These stories served to justify the higher intensity work 
practices that the CCP prescribed: “That idea of going to a person's home will open your eyes 
sometimes to something that an experienced person might just catch... depending on the acuity of 
a person, health home, care coordination, it can't be one size fits all” (HighQual Director).  
Similarly, the Program Director showed a strong awareness of high-risk, mental health 
members, and the Operations Supervisor emphasized advocacy and empowerment as care 
coordination aims. These supervisory structures reinforced social work principles that justified 
higher intensity practices.  
CCP CCs also had the experience that made them understand the value of high-intensity 
practices. They articulated the importance of being aware of psychological issues such as 
suicidal ideation, intervening in crises and deriving important information from home visits. CCs 
identified as social workers and drew on each other’s particular strengths that derived from their 
experiences, such as one CC’s special knowledge on harm reduction. They could present various 
instances in which home visits were crucial in improving a member’s care. For example, one CC 
recounted how she visited a member at home because he had not come to an appointment at 
HighQual. The reason was that he did not have enough money to afford transportation to the 
clinic. For the CC, this information allowed a more realistic understanding of a member’s 
situation that could be easily remedied through the clinic’s access to resources. Moreover, it 
reinforced more understanding among doctors as well of the socio-economic issues that members 
face: 
 
“Because we do home visits we are able to see how this patient lives…if we don't do 
those type of outreach, we are never going to be able to bring that information back to the doctor 
  62 
and this is where there's more caring. You know, the caring and the understanding that this 
patient didn't come, not because he didn't want to but because he couldn't…we deal with a lot of 
poverty, single Moms or males who live in shelters, who live in rented room or who depend 
from, I'm not gonna say depend from the system but cannot work for whatever reason. That's 
why we go out there” (CC2).  
 
In these ways, HighQual’s occupational community generated provider buy-in for case 
conferencing, and the promotion of social work principles as well as CCs’ experience base that 
provided normative justifications for engaging in higher intensity work practices. 
 
Regional Occupational Community as a Source for Higher Regulatory Standards 
HighQual’s occupational community derived from its staff’s extensive prior occupational 
experience in care coordination and served to justify and enable the higher intensity practices 
that the CCP prescribed, enforced, and incentivized. However, the occupational community of 
which the HighQual staff formed a part also served as a basis for the CCP’s high standards. By 
contrast, the officials who designed the low-intensity HHP consciously prioritized cost-
effectiveness over following the region’s previous experience in care coordination. 
Both policy programs’ origins were Federal in nature, with the HHP based on Section 
2703 of the 2010 Affordable Care Act and the CCP based on congressional Ryan White Part A 
funds originally set up in 1990. Both Programs also served predominantly low-income 
individuals with the HHP being a Medicaid program and 67% of Ryan White clients living at or 
below the Federal Poverty line in 2014 (HRSA 2014: 4). Moreover, the Federal guidelines for 
both Programs limited eligibility only in a very general way and permitted States a lot of leeway 
in implementing the Programs. 
The main difference between the Programs was that the officials in charge of 
implementing the Programs had different aims and priorities. Officials designed the low-intensity 
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HHP primarily to reduce costs while officials designed the high-intensity CCP to maximize 
improvements in health outcomes by drawing on practices that the HIV/AIDS community had 
developed.  
Because NYS had the largest Medicaid bill in the US (NYS-DoH 2011) and Governor 
Cuomo’s administration inherited a $10bn deficit (Senior Policy Researcher) in 2011, Cuomo 
established the ‘Medicaid Redesign Team’ to lower Medicaid costs and improve care quality. 
The Team recommended participating in a Federal waiver, capping the Medicaid budget, and 
participating in the HHP (NYS-DoH 2011).   
Accordingly, the HHP’s main aim was to consolidate previous care coordination 
programs for behavioral health and HIV/AIDS in NYS by grandfathering them into the HHP 
(Policy Consultant for NYS-DoH). Because individual agencies could bill the State directly 
under these programs the administration of these programs was highly fragmented and costly. 
From this perspective, the NYS-DoH HHP centralized billing through the decentralized billing 
and monitoring structure of Lead Health Homes managing multiple Downstream Providers 
(Lead HH Finance Manager). Furthermore, while service providers did not have to cooperate 
previously, the decentralized structure made Lead Health Homes and their Downstream 
Providers cooperate (Senior Policy Researcher) in the hope that existing resources would be used 
more efficiently. Despite this aim, the NYS-DoH’s preliminary analyses showed improved 
outcomes but few cost savings because the cost of managing the HHP was still too high (DoH 
HHP Official). 
In accordance with the aim of consolidating previous programs, the first program years’ 
focus was to increase the maximum number of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in the HHP and 
reach 975,000 individuals. Only in later years and when the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
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Services had developed quality indicators would more refined reimbursement and monitoring 
occur (DoH HHP Official). The HHP was more successful in this regard. As of March 2016, the 
NYS HHP was the second largest HHP in the US with 231,543 enrollees (CMS 2016).  
To achieve high participation, policymakers chose open, unspecific standards with a 
reimbursement system that provided incentives to increase the HHP’s number of enrollees. The 
State chose flat-rate per member per month reimbursement because outcomes-based 
reimbursement might have kept service providers from participating, especially because the 
HHP’s target population was the most complicated to serve (Management Consultant for NYS-
DoH). Rather than specifying clear standards, the State issued guidance in response to provider 
questions. At the Lead Health Home under study, guidance usually enforced low, open 
standards. For example, the certification criteria for a Lead Health Home included “regular case 
review meetings” (NYS-DoH 2012) but it did not specify time frames for such reviews. Lead 
Health Home administrators decided to set the standard of reviewing initial assessments every 
three months (Lead HH Administrator). However, smaller Downstream Providers could not meet 
this standard, so the administrators changed it to every six months until the State decided that the 
initial assessment should be updated only “if something major happens” (Lead HH 
Administrator) like hospitalization.         
In enforcing such open standards, State officials consciously decided not to draw on the 
higher standards from the previous care coordination programs it consolidated, for example the 
COBRA Program. Established in 1986, the COBRA Program included a maximum of 40 
caseloads, a differentiated division of labor, and reimbursement set to units of services provided 
rather than per members (HIV/AIDS Community-Based Organization Director). In spite of staff 
with public health and social work backgrounds working on the NYS-DoH HHP’s design, and 
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access to the people who designed the COBRA program (Policy Consultant to NYS-DoH), cost-
effectiveness through consolidation remained the priority in the design of the NYS-DoH HHP.  
By contrast, the CCP officials based their program design on 30 years of institutional 
knowledge and resources that an HIV/AIDS prevention community had developed and 
advocated for. This community is partly Federal in nature such as the AIDS Drug Assistance 
Program that was created in 1987 to help pay for necessary medical services and pharmaceuticals 
(AIDS Institute 2013). But with New York City being a large center for HIV/AIDS throughout 
the epidemic’s history, NYS has had more resources for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in 
comparison to other States (Care Coordination Health Educator; HIV/AIDS Community-Based 
Organization Director; HighQual Director).  
In the context of this strong institutional support on both Federal and State levels, a 
community of HIV/AIDS social and medical services providers developed that prepared much of 
the care coordination methodology in use today (HIV/AIDS Community-Based Organization 
CEO), including the above-mentioned buddy system, the COBRA program, and the NYC-
DoHMH CCP’s high standards. The AIDS Institute was a particularly important actor in this 
respect. The NYS-DoH established it in 1983 to provide (medical) research and educational 
services, and to develop standards for HIV/AIDS care, including to certify medical providers as 
Designated AIDS Centers from 1985 onwards (AIDS Institute 2013). In 2008, the AIDS Institute 
updated its standards to promote “a comprehensive, collaborative, integrated system of service 
provision” (AIDS Institute 2008) by requiring Designated AIDS Centers to work more closely 
with COBRA providers and to provide intensive care coordination to “patients with multiple and 
complex psychosocial/health related needs” (AIDS Institute 2006a: 4). 
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In 2006, the Institute also published a 52-page document outlining standards for 
HIV/AIDS care coordination (AIDS Institute 2006b), which was a pre-cursor for the NYC-
DoHMH CCP, outlining much of the same procedures, tasks, values and specificity regarding 
work organization. For example, the standards mandated an assessment based on a long list of 
medical factors (including chronic conditions other than HIV/AIDS) and social factors (such as 
housing, financial resources or support systems) (AIDS Institute 2006b: 4-8). In terms of work 
organization, it also recommended caseloads of between 15 and 35 cases, detailed CC and 
supervisor qualifications, and required a home visit to initially assess high-needs cases. 
Apart from these standards, the CCP officials also drew on numerous academic studies 
evaluating effective practices for HIV/AIDS prevention to design the high-intensity NYC-DoH 
CCP. They specifically drew on a model piloted first with low-income, HIV-positive individuals 
in Haiti and then applied in Boston. This model included directly observed therapy that 
community health workers conducted (Behforouz et al. 2004). Officials from the CCP Research 
and Evaluation Unit have since provided evidence from pre/post analyses that the model has 
significantly lowered viral loads and improved engagement in care (Irvine et al. 2015). 
In these ways, CCP officials consciously built on 30 years of institutional knowledge, the 
application of which they evaluated in the CCP’s context. Instead of cost-effectiveness, CCP 
officials thus prioritized evidence-based practices that the broader occupational community in 
HIV/AIDS prevention had devised. However, the decision to clearly specify work organization 
to such a high degree was novel: “we went a lot further than the minimum [Federal] 
guidelines…as guidance-heavy as we were, we had not done that previously” (CCP Official).  
The impact of occupational community thus did not only precede workplace dynamics in 
terms of the previous occupational experience of clinic staff but the CCP officials’ conscious 
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decision to draw on a broader occupational community enabled the combination of high 
regulatory intensity and workplace-level occupational community that led to HighQual’s 
implementation of high quality work practices.  
 
4.4 Alternative Explanations 
Though my research design controlled for several alternative explanations, I examined 
others that I could not control for. One factor is demographic differences among the agencies’ 
workforces, similar to DiBenigno and Kellogg’s (2014) cases in which nurses and patient-care 
technicians were only able to collaborate effectively if they shared the same underlying 
demographics of age and race. In my case, the demographic composition of all care coordination 
programs was very similar: the CCs and Operations Supervisors were either African American or 
Hispanic while the Directors (except one), physicians, licensed social workers and 
psychotherapists were Caucasian. Moreover, the majority of all care coordination staff (including 
supervisory staff) was female, and all CCs either grew up or lived in the area of study, so they all 
knew the health system’s catchment area well. 
Another explanation may be that MedQual CCs were less motivated to do their job and 
thus engaged in lower intensity practices. However, though one physician mentioned that 
motivation had been an issue with a CC in MedQual’s second year, the problem had been dealt 
with quickly. Moreover, MedQual’s Operations Supervisor stated problems with motivation 
were rare and in these instances, a written warning made CCs perform their work adequately. A 
related explanation may be that MedQual CCs interpreted their compensation as particularly low 
and were less motivated to engage in high-intensity practices. However, despite higher pay at 
MedQual and HighQual, all CCs described their compensation as inadequate and felt underpaid. 
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Furthermore, CCs in all agencies described their motivations as helping others and finding 
meaning in members’ gratitude.  
Differences in the nature of tasks may also account for different skill levels. This 
understanding posits more difficult tasks required HighQual CCs to be more skilled compared to 
the LowQual and MedQual. However, if this were correct we would not see differences between 
LowQual and MedQual because they both had a centralized division of labor, the Director 
assigned them the same tasks, and the NYS-DoH HHP did not provide standards or incentives 
for higher intensity tasks in either HH. Moreover, we would then expect HighQual CCs to have 
the highest skill levels because they performed the highest intensity services. However, both 
MedQual and HighQual CCs had similar years of experience. Further, MedQual CCs had 
degrees in the related fields of Human Services or Social Work while HighQual CCs had non-
related degrees.  
Furthermore, neither HighQual nor MedQual CCs performed tasks that would inherently 
require higher skill levels. If home visits (the most intensive ongoing care task) were inherently 
more complex and required skilled personnel we would not see organizations other than highly 
professionalized ones such as hospitals performing home visits. However, community-based 
organizations with unlicensed social workers have traditionally performed home visits in the 
health system’s region, often with minimal training and lacking or poor safety protocols (CBO 
CC1; CBO CC2; Training Field Note 12/01/2016). Furthermore, according to HighQual staff, 
home visits require entering potentially dangerous places in low-income neighborhoods, and 
accordingly, a safety protocol to deal with such situations. They further require a basic 
understanding of what social issues may inhibit members’ medical compliance so that the CC 
doing the home visit can recognize such issues. If organizations develop adequate safety 
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protocols and provide on-the-job training, also unlicensed social workers without degrees may 
perform such home visits and add value to the health team treating members (CC2; HighQual 
Director), as they have historically in the social work occupation (Austin 1978).  
Another explanation may be that the HighQual and MedQual had higher acuity members, 
in turn requiring higher intensity practices. However, as mentioned above, eligibility criteria for 
both policy programs included multiple or high acuity chronic disease patients. Moreover, when 
I asked Lead Health Home administrators whether the health system under study received 
particular patient types they replied it received substance abuse, mental health, HIV/AIDS and 
general medical patients. Furthermore, when I asked the CCs to describe their member 
population they said most their patients had mental health issues such as severe depression in 
addition to their chronic conditions. Moreover, HighQual staff also emphasized that patients 
commonly had behavioral health issues or severe social issues such as homelessness, and that 
severe mental illness such as schizophrenia had increased. Apart from a slight increase in West 
African individuals, physicians reported no changes in the health system’s patient acuity over the 
past decade. A common justification for the high acuity, confirmed by community health needs 
assessments, was that the health system’s catchment area had the highest acuity regarding several 
chronic and sexually transmitted diseases in its region. This was also the reason for a new care 
coordination program with the eligibility criterion of only one chronic disease to be struggling: it 
was common knowledge that chronic disease patients living in the health system’s catchment 
area had more than one chronic disease. 
Another possible explanation might consist of differences in management structures. 
Perhaps senior managers funded or prioritized some agencies over others. This, however, was 
also not the case. First, both Directors reported to the same senior manager with whom they 
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reported a good working relationship. Second, a focus on ambulatory care had been the health 
system’s general strategy since 2006. Three upper middle managers confirmed this and counted 
the programs under study as exemplars of this strategy. Third, as described, the programs were 
revenue generating, meaning they required funds only for start-up expenses. For example, as 
mentioned above, the HH nurse had already been employed at the same clinic for several years 
and simply changed function. In addition to senior management support, the health system also 
had a “very thin layer of middle management” (Upper Middle Manager Population 
Management), endowing middle managers with considerable autonomy to allocate clinic funds.  
Training or differences in worker autonomy may also account for difference. However, 
all staff reported the prevalence of on-the-job training with speakers from outside being brought 
in occasionally to discuss various clinical topics such as good nutrition. HighQual included a 
train-the-trainer model that the NYC-DoHMH CCP mandated. Once per month a CC designated 
as a trainer led a one-and-a-half-hour training session. However, the session’s main benefit was 
to draw on other CCs’ experience. LowQual’s team meetings also fulfilled this function (albeit 
inefficiently due to the Director’s hierarchical control) and MedQual CCs also reported drawing 
on each other’s competencies informally. Moreover, the trade union offered training courses for 
ongoing education but only to nurses and technicians such as x-ray technicians, not to CCs. In 
terms of autonomy, all CCs described their working as autonomous most of the time. Except for 
the team meetings and the Operations Supervisor’s periodic review of CCs’ progress notes and 
tracking sheets, LowQual CCs decided autonomously how to deal with members, which they 
likened to a licensed practitioners’ autonomy but without corresponding compensation. 
The final alternative explanation may be that there were differences in how the trade 
union acted within the three agencies. The collective bargaining agreement defined the principle 
  71 
that workers in the same job classification had to receive the same compensation, thus 
accounting for lacking variation in compensation within CC positions in each agency. Apart 
from this, however, the trade union did not impact work organization because the collective 
bargaining agreement did not empower the union to do so.  
The trade union was powerful and its delegates effective at challenging management. The 
senior union official responsible for the health system described the union’s power as deriving 
from the fact that it was “wall-to-wall”, i.e. it was the only union covering all health workers 
there. Moreover, LowQual had a delegate in its care coordination team. This delegate had 
defended their interests in a separate matter relating to whether positions in a new care 
coordination program as part of a new policy program were to have the requirement of being 
degreed or not. Because this decision pertained to a policy program a public policymaker located 
at the health system, not a manager, decided not to include a requirement of being degreed (so 
that also LowQual CCs could apply for these positions). The policymaker was unconstrained by 
any collective bargaining agreement. LowQual CCs had informed the delegate they felt 
underpaid but the delegate had no recourse because the collective bargaining agreement did not 
permit the union to demand re-classifications of existing positions, only pay standardization for 
the same classification. Furthermore, HighQual’s Director reported two incidents in the past 
three years in which a delegate grieved his decisions, including the need to do home visits. 
However, because the delegate had no backing in the collective bargaining agreement (and there 
was a safety protocol in place for home visits), the trade union organizer had to concede that the 
Director was correct, against the delegate.  
The collective bargaining agreement stated that jobs had to be announced internally first 
and HR had to try to fill these positions with union members so that the union had influence over 
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how recruiting played out. However, managers still retained control over whom they hired as 
long as they showed that they considered the union candidates fairly for the job. The collective 
bargaining agreement gave managers full discretion over how to design job requirements, 
including tasks, the division of labor between jobs, and caseloads. Both Directors were aware of 
this and used it to their advantage by narrowing their job requirements:  
 
“The union can't tell you how to build a job description…[or] how to build your protocol, they 
can't tell you what kind of staffing pattern you can have” (HighQual Director).  
 
“When I have an opening, it has to be posted to the union, so I keep trying to narrow down my 
job requirements, so that I only get what I want” (HH Director).  
    
Therefore, even though the health system was unionized and the union exerted power 
within the system and the agencies, managers had almost full discretion over the definition of the 
care model and once they had decided on a particular job design, union delegates, organizers and 
senior officials were unable to change the design because the collective bargaining agreement 
granted them no power to do this. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to understand the conditions that shape the quality of work 
practices in terms of their skill and intensity as part of the implementation of care coordination 
programs in three care management agencies. To study these conditions, I chose a research 
setting relevant to the type of services and population under study (care coordination services for 
low-income, high-acuity patients). My findings are thus generalizable to similarly resource-poor 
settings that are usually the focus of care coordination programs.  
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I identified the existence of an occupational community as a factor that improved the 
quality of work practices. Only, however, under the condition of a highly intensive regulatory 
environment did the highest quality of work practices emerge.  
Relevant for organizational policymakers are the management decisions that enabled the 
occupational communities to emerge, even if these decisions were not always taken with the 
intent of promoting an occupational community. They located care coordination services within 
clinics with histories of similar types of services and a relevant occupational composition (such 
as behavioral health and HIV/AIDS prevention); they emphasized extensive, relevant experience 
in placing staff within such programs; and they raised awareness among other providers 
regarding the utility and scope of care coordination services through repeated meetings with 
other providers and through daily involvement in clinic operations. Except for the last point, the 
fact that the area had a previous history of community support facilitated these decisions because 
this history of community support resulted in a labor market that included many experienced, 
non-professional social workers. In areas without a history of community support, the labor 
market may be more limited in terms of non-professional social workers’ experience. Rather than 
being a set of HR practices that are easily prescribed and implemented, the emergence of a 
broader social process of occupational community that included supervisors, clinical providers, 
and CCs working towards the same goal embeds these practices.   
The second factor that was present in the clinic with the highest quality of work practices 
was a highly intensive regulatory environment consisting of clear, occupationally-based 
standards of work organization; high monitoring requirements and multiple workplace visits per 
year, managed not through a decentralized but through a centralized structure; and a 
reimbursement mechanism that provided incentives for higher intensity practices for higher 
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acuity patients. Relevant for public policymakers were not the priorities to reach broad 
enrollment and cost-containment but to draw on occupational standards from a community with 
three decades of experience in a related area and to provide incentives for higher intensity 
services. This type of design may be more difficult to achieve than an occupational community at 
the organizational level because it depended on extensive health activism (Altman 1994) that led 
to Federal and State level institutional support, including the development of care coordination 
methods and standards. However, where such methods and standards exist, public policymakers 
should draw on them to achieve more specific standards. For the literature on public procurement 
high regulatory intensity means that making contract awards conditional on standards is only one 
aspect of creating a successful policy apparatus: they also require appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms and incentives. Moreover, not only are regulations dependent on political 
contingencies (such as the broader institutional support in the HIV/AIDS area) but also on the 
availability of and public policymakers’ ability and willingness to draw on occupational 
expertise. To the literature on high-performance work systems, I contribute a consideration of the 
regulatory intensity under which these practices operate and which conditions their success. 
Moreover, my findings indicate potential interactions between occupational community 
(on the workplace level but also more broadly, on regional and political levels) and regulatory 
intensity. First, an occupational community at the workplace level may provide an additional 
level of commitment that reinforces a high level of intensity. Second, occupational community 
on a regional and political level may shape policymakers’ choice of the level of regulatory 
intensity. In these ways, both interactions limit the prioritization of cost-effectiveness, which 
lowers the quality of work practices.  
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First, while MedQual’s occupational community led to some higher quality practices, 
only the NYC-DoHMH CCP’s higher level of regulatory intensity provided the basis for higher 
intensity practices such as regular home visits. Moreover, if high regulatory intensity were 
enough for the highest quality, all NYC-DoHMH CCP service providers would achieve 
HighQual’s level of quality. However, HighQual was only one of few service providers who 
achieved close to full compliance in recent audits. At both MedQual and HighQual, occupational 
community provided normative justifications for following high-intensity work practices such as 
agency visits. However, only at HighQual did the CCP’s high regulatory intensity provide the 
financial incentives necessary for keeping caseloads low enough to sustain the high work effort 
that high-intensity practices such as frequent case conferencing and home visits entail. By 
contrast, the HHP’s low reimbursement did not permit the low caseloads that are necessary for 
such high work effort. This means that a workplace-level, occupational community by itself only 
produces intermediate intensity but high regulatory intensity is necessary to ensure the financial 
viability of implementing the higher level of intensity that HighQual exhibited.   
Second, occupational community at HighQual and the NYC-DoHMH CCP built on a 
broader HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment community that consisted of State and Federal level 
institutions and medical and social services practitioners dating back to the beginning of the 
1980s. By contrast, the NYS-DoH HHP’s background resided more in cost-control by 
administrative consolidation and the extension of care coordination to the maximum of high-cost 
and high-needs Medicaid beneficiaries. Despite access to the experience and knowledge of 
higher standard care coordination programs, the overarching concern of the NYS-DoH HHP 
administrators was the implementation of cost-containment policies. In this way, the influence of 
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a broader occupational community may shape whether policymakers’ design a program in favor 
of occupational (instead of non-occupational) aims and standards.  
Overall, both social processes of occupational community at the workplace level and 
occupationally-based standards promoted through regulatory standards serve to limit the negative 
effect of cost concerns on the quality of work practices. In the absence of high regulatory 
intensity cost concerns reduced quality to an intermediate level. However, when a workplace 
level occupational community was also lacking, cost-effectiveness drove down quality to the 
level that low-standard regulations permitted. In these ways, prioritizing cost-effectiveness 
lowers the quality of work practices.   
The propositions regarding the logical relationship between occupational community and 
regulatory intensity, their interaction between them, and their limiting effect on cost concerns 
could be subjects of further research in other resource settings and economic sectors that may 
yield a broader theory of the explanatory factors that shape the quality of work practices.      
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